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ABSTRACT
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PERITRAUMATIC ENCODING
DISRUPTION HYPOTHESIS: INTRODUCING EVENT
SEGMENTATION AS A MARKER OF
MOMENT-TO-MOMENT
PROCESSING
Andrew M. Sherrill, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Michelle M. Lilly, Ph.D., Co-Director
Joseph P. Magliano, Ph.D., Co-Director

Cognitive theories of PTSD assume that increases in peritraumatic anxiety and
dissociation disrupts standard encoding processes, namely with an attentional bias toward
perceptual information and away from conceptual information. However, this assumption
currently lacks supporting evidence using moment-to-moment markers of encoding processes.
This project explores if one specific encoding process, event segmentation, is impacted during a
stressful event and if such an impact affects memory for the event. Event segmentation is an
encoding process that involves chunking streams of continuous spatiotemporal information into
discrete units. In studies measuring event segmentation during non-stressful events, findings
suggest that segmentation ability positively predicts event memory. To date, no studies have
assessed the impact of stress on event segmentation and subsequent memory.
This project measured moment-to-moment event segmentation during a non-stressful
film and a stressful film using a paradigm that requires participants to indicate boundaries
between “meaningful units of activity” while watching each film. The aim of this project is to

use the event segmentation task as a measurable, non-invasive, moment-to-moment marker of
one encoding process during a stressful experience to provide an analog test of a core assumption
within cognitive theories of PTSD. Specifically, unsystematic event segmentation was used as a
marker for anxiety- and dissociation-impacted encoding based on the premise that any factor that
affects attentional engagement in an experience is expected to decrease the systematicity of
segmentation. Attentional engagement allows event segmentation to be influenced by (a)
changes in the physical environment and (b) prior knowledge.
This project was motivated by four hypotheses, all conceptually based on cognitive
theories of PTSD and the empirical literature on event segmentation. Hypothesis 1 proposed that
segmentation of stressful experiences is less systematic when compared against the segmentation
of everyday, non-stressful experiences. Hypothesis 2 proposed that affective and dissociative
responses within stressful experiences result in reduced systematicity of segmentation.
Hypothesis 3 proposed that reduced segmentation systematicity results in poor voluntary
memory (recall and recognition). Hypothesis 4 proposed that reduced systematicity of
segmentation is a conduit (i.e., mediator) through which anxiety and dissociation have a negative
effect on voluntary memory.
The final sample included 73 mixed-gendered NIU students (predominantly freshmen)
with no sexual assault histories or symptoms of PTSD. Planned analyses indicated no support
for any of the four hypotheses. However, data analyses revealed numerous significant effects.
Each significant effect was in the opposite direction of predictions. Most critically, and opposite
of the direction predicted by Hypothesis 1, the stressful film resulted in higher segmentation
scores than the non-stressful film. The remaining hypotheses assumed stressful experiences

would diminish (not enhance) segmentation scores; therefore, it was not surprising to discover
the remaining analyses produced results that trended (often significantly) in the opposite
direction of predictions. Other unexpected significant effects included positive effects of anxiety
and dissociation on segmentation systematicity (opposite of Hypothesis 2), a negative effect of
segmentation systematicity on recognition of the stressful film (opposite of Hypothesis 3), and
mediating effects of high (not low) segmentation systematicity on the negative relationship
between anxiety and dissociation on event memory (opposite of Hypothesis 4).
One possibility is that anxiety and dissociation may enhance segmentation systematicity
in a manner that is consistent with theories of PTSD that emphasize increased sensitivity to
perceptual features during traumatic events. Research on event segmentation has consistently
showed that segmentation happens when there is perceptual change. The finding that
segmentation was negatively correlated with memory performance for the stressful film but was
positively correlated with memory performance for the non-stressful film lends credence to this
interpretation. Given the unexpected nature of the findings, this interpretation should be
considered with caution and would benefit from replication. Although the significant findings
were unexpected, the results suggest measuring anxiety- and dissociation-induced change to at
least one encoding process (i.e., event segmentation) is possible within the laboratory. This is
the first known study to demonstrate that encoding during an analog traumatic event can be
measured moment-to-moment and has interpretable implications on memory. The results of this
study lend credence to future research exploring the relationship between segmentation and
memory in the context of traumatic experiences.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Memory disturbance in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) has two general characteristics: (a) perceptually based involuntary
recollections of the traumatic event that are often experienced as vivid and salient and (b)
conceptually based voluntary recollections of the traumatic event that are often experienced as
incomplete, disorganized, and fragmented (Brewin, 2011). Cognitive theories of PTSD (Brewin,
Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) share the central etiological premise that
alterations in affect and dissociation during a stressful experience will disrupt standard encoding
processes, namely with an attentional bias toward perceptual information and away from
conceptual information. This theoretical assumption is called the peritraumatic encoding
disruption (PED) hypothesis. For the past several decades, one major research objective has
been to better understand how characteristics of peritraumatic encoding might contribute to a
memory-based etiological pathway to psychopathology.
One construal of the PED hypothesis that has received significant research attention is
Brewin and colleagues’ dual representation theory (DRT; Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin, Gregory,
Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; for a review, see Brewin, 2014). According to DRT, maladaptive
peritraumatic encoding results from a stress-induced down-regulation of the episodic memory
system (Elzinga & Bremner, 2002; Payne et al., 2006; Vyas, Mitra, Rao, & Chattarji, 2002).
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During this down-regulation, preference is given to encoding survival-related information such
as threat-related images and sounds, which comes at the cost of encoding more abstract,
conceptual information such as causal inferences and spatiotemporal context. In other words,
perceptual processing is decoupled from conceptual processing. This decoupling leads to (a)
perceptual memory representations that are not contextualized within one’s autobiographical
memory and (b) episodic memories that do not retain potentially important perceptual details.
DRT assumes that memory for traumatic events are dominated by perceptual details and
lack important conceptual/situational content (e.g., spatially, temporally, and causally related
sequence of events). As such, environmental or internal cues can trigger perceptual
representations (e.g., intrusive images) without also retrieving the appropriate autobiographical
context of the full traumatic event. For example, a combat veteran may hear a firework
explosion on New Year’s Day 2015, which then triggers intrusive images of an incinerated
Humvee and dead soldiers but does not cue events associated with a specific episode, such as an
attack that happened in Iraq during summer of 2006. The firework explosion can also trigger
previously experienced emotions and physiological reactions, a phenomenon known as reexperiencing. These memory disturbances are proposed to persist until the perceptual
representations and episodic memories are adequately integrated, which may occur through
natural recovery or clinical interventions that require repeated rehearsal of the complete memory
within a safe environment.
Despite the claim that PED is critical to the development of PTSD-related memory
problems (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000), there is currently no evidence directly
linking PTSD-related memory problems to encoding mechanisms measured moment-to-moment.
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Accordingly, the PED hypothesis has excited a contentious controversy as to whether or not
“special trauma mechanisms” such as the “decoupling of perceptual and conceptual processing”
are needed in etiological models of PTSD (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Pearson, 2014; Peace,
Porter, & ten Brinke, 2008; Porter & Birt, 2001; Rubin, Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008; Rubin, Boals,
& Berntsen, 2008; Shobe & Kihlstrom, 1997).
Opponents of the PED hypothesis argue that the “event amnesia” criterion of PTSD is not
empirically supported (Berntsen & Rubin, 2014) while the basic (i.e., non-clinical) memory
research suggests voluntary memories of stressful experiences should be enhanced due to the
facilitative effect of stress on memory (e.g., Buchanan & Lovallo, 2001; Schwabe et al., 2009).
This argument implies the relationship between memory formation and stress has been strongly
established; however, this relationship is considerably nuanced and complex and has not yet been
rigorously tested (Roediger, 2008). Additionally, even if stress is shown to predict the encoding
of a larger quantity of retrievable information, only a moment-to-moment marker of encoding
processes can elucidate the manner in which stress might impact encoding processes and how
these changes may subsequently affect memory. Therefore, the PED hypothesis remains an
empirical question. As Brewin (2014) argues, this controversy will be most adequately
addressed not by determining the validity of “special trauma mechanisms” but rather
understanding how standard memory mechanisms operate during both non-stressful experiences
and stressful experiences. As such, a closer examination is needed in the context of moment-tomoment encoding processes during experiences that vary in affective response and how these
affect-related processes might potentially influence trauma-related memory disturbance.
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Human memory is commonly described as an information processing system that has
three broad stages: encoding, storage, and retrieval. While all three stages are relevant to this
project, particularly close attention is given to encoding due to its emphasis within the PED
hypothesis. Encoding refers to the general concept of transforming physical sensations into units
of information that can be stored in memory (Tulving, 2001). The ontological nature of these
“units of information” has long been controversial in cognitive science and is beyond the scope
of the current project. However, it is important to highlight how the broad concept of encoding
encapsulates many theoretical “encoding processes” including, to name a few, visual encoding,
acoustic encoding, semantic encoding, and organizational encoding. It is infeasible to test all
encoding processes simultaneously. Thus, to test the PED hypothesis, a researcher can only
target a limited number of encoding processes. In this project, one potentially fruitful encoding
process was used due to its temporally dynamic quality and ease of measurement: event
segmentation. In this document, readers should be cognizant that the broad concept of encoding
is specifically addressed with event segmentation as just one of many encoding processes.
Findings related to event segmentation provide no direct insights regarding other encoding
processes.
What is event segmentation? First, consider the possibility that encoding an event,
whether traumatic or non-traumatic, involves a system of perception processes by which an
observer can detect spatiotemporal entities (i.e., events) within temporally extended information
and then recognize such entities as belonging to a class (i.e., what kind of event; Zacks, 2008).
To illustrate these processes, consider how one typically perceives the start of a baseball game:
the ceremonial first pitch, the national anthem, the actual first pitch, etc. The current study
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specifically focuses on the first half of this detect-and-recognize sequence, event segmentation.
Event segmentation is the process by which a person is able to identify the boundaries between
smaller events that make up a larger event (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007).
This process allows one to efficiently chunk streams of continuous information. For example,
when washing the dishes, one is able to identify that the activity is comprised of an iterative set
of actions, such as reaching for a dish, washing the dish, and placing the dish in a drain board.
When recalling a past experience of dish washing, the complete and linear stream of activity is
less likely to be represented than a quick series of images of your hands scrubbing or touching
plates, bowls, and silverware.
The ability to segment non-stressful experiences into a coherent structure of smaller units
has been positively linked to the quality of the memory for that experience (e.g., Bailey et al.,
2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Zacks, Speer, Vettel, & Jacoby, 2006), even after controlling for
other cognitive factors associated with memory (Sargent et al., 2013). To date, no studies have
assessed the impact of stress, or specifically anxiety and dissociation, on event segmentation and
subsequent memory. Moment-to-moment event segmentation is commonly measured by a
paradigm referred to as the event segmentation task (Newtson, 1973; Zacks & Tversky, 2001),
which requires research participants to indicate boundaries between “meaningful units of
activity” while experiencing an unfolding event (e.g., watching a video or reading a narrative).
Using this task, event segmentation may potentially be used as a measurable, non-invasive,
moment-to-moment marker of encoding during a stressful experience, which can provide a basis
for testing the PED hypothesis.
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There has been a concerted effort in clinical research to identify the mechanisms that
underlie the chronic memory difficulties of PTSD (for reviews, see Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner,
2012; Brewin, 2011, 2014). However, this research has not yet addressed the important role of
event segmentation on memory. The current study examines the relationships between stressful
responding, event segmentation, and event memory difficulties. Specifically, using a trauma
analog design using the stressful film paradigm (SFP), the current study investigates if stressful
responding results in memory disturbance indirectly through unsystematic event segmentation.
The PED hypothesis has long assumed a mediating role of encoding disruption. The current
study introduces unsystematic event segmentation as a marker for encoding disruption, based on
the premise that any factor that affects attentional engagement in an experience is expected to
decrease the systematicity of segmentation. Attentional engagement allows event segmentation
to be influenced by (a) changes in the physical environment and (b) prior knowledge (Zacks et
al., 2007). Importantly, stressful experiences are marked by a wide variety of responses that may
negatively affect attentional engagement including alterations in a class of affect-related
characteristics such as state anxiety and state dissociation (Brewin, Andrews, & Rose, 2000;
Rizvi, Kaysen, Gutner, Griffen, & Resick, 2008).
The following literature review will include a discussion regarding limitations of the
current empirical support for the PED hypothesis, particularly the theoretical implication that
PED should lead to memory disturbance. In addition, the following literature review will include
a discussion of the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of event segmentation research.
The current study addresses the lack of moment-to-moment encoding data by investigating PED
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within the context of an event segmentation task, which can provide a non-invasive marker of
encoding disruption.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

The current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) defines
PTSD as a constellation of the following symptoms presenting for at least one month after direct
or indirect exposure to a traumatic event: (a) intrusive experiences (e.g., flashbacks and high
physiological reactivity to trauma reminders), (b) avoidance of trauma-related memories and
external reminders, (c) negative alterations in cognitions and mood (e.g., inability to recall key
features of the traumatic event), and (d) alterations in arousal and reactivity (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Within DSM-5, the unique facet of these diagnostic criteria for
PTSD, as well as other trauma- and stressor-related disorders, is the requirement of exposure to
an environmental antecedent, specifically, an index traumatic event.
Although many affective states (or “peritraumatic reactions”) may occur during exposure
to a traumatic event, the current study considers two particularly common experiences,
specifically state anxiety and state dissociation. State anxiety is defined as a temporary feeling
of fear, nervousness, and discomfort, as well as the arousal of the autonomic nervous system,
which is induced by the perception of threats or danger (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene,
1970). State dissociation is broadly defined as “a disruption of and/or discontinuity in the
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normal integration of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation,
motor control, and behavior” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 291). State
dissociation during exposure to a traumatic event (i.e., “peritraumatic dissociation”) is one of the
strongest predictors of chronic PTSD development (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003; see also,
Briere, Scott, & Weathers, 2005).
While numerous psychological theories of PTSD exist (see Brewin & Holmes, 2003),
several prominent theories converge with respect to the proposal that the environmental
antecedent of PTSD (i.e., an index traumatic event) not only causes stress during exposure (e.g.,
state anxiety and state dissociation), but also can continue to afflict the person through the
indirect pathway of memory (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa, Steketee, &
Rothbaum, 1989). A vast literature supports the idea that PTSD is a disorder of memory
disturbance (Brewin, 2011, 2014). Memory disturbance in PTSD is often characterized as the
coupled problems of (a) fragmented voluntary conceptual trauma memories and (b) easilytriggered involuntary perceptual trauma memories. The current study exclusively focuses on
“fragmented” (or “disorganized”) trauma memories, which are recollections of distressing
experiences that have a general lack of narrative coherence characterized by an absence of
important details or a confusing temporal order (Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; Huntjens,
Wessel, Postma, van Wees-Cieraad, & de Jong, 2015; van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). While
memory fragmentation is documented as characteristic of PTSD (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013; Jelinek, Randjbar, Seifert, Kellner, & Moritz, 2009), empirical findings are
mixed (O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006), and little empirical evidence supports the premise that
traumatic events are initially encoded in a particularly disjointed or fragmented manner (Segovia,
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Strange, & Takarangi, 2016). Most research examining the etiology of memory fragmentation
has investigated the role of peritraumatic dissociation (Buck, Kindt, & van den Hout, 2006;
Kindt et al., 2005; Kindt & van den Hout, 2003). However, this literature has failed to
demonstrate a causal link between peritraumatic dissociation and objectively measured memory
fragmentation (Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012).

Psychological Theory of PTSD

As mentioned above, to explain the coupled problems of poor voluntary memory and
strong involuntary memory of the traumatic event, cognitive theories of PTSD suggest the
occurrence of some type of peritraumatic encoding disruption (PED) that results from extreme
affective or dissociative responses (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Thus,
understanding the development of PTSD may be contingent upon elucidating the roles of various
memory processes, particularly encoding mechanisms. Although the current study primarily
considers PED from the perspective of dual representation theory (DRT; Brewin et al., 1996,
2010), other closely related clinical models such as Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive theory
make similar predictions regarding the influence of encoding disruptions on memory disturbance
(Holmes & Bourne, 2008).
As reviewed in Chapter 1 (Introduction), DRT assumes that typical encoding of everyday
experiences involves the coordination of perceptual processing and conceptual processing,
which, respectively, result in two types of encoded representations: (a) sensory-bound,
perceptual representations and (b) contextual, conceptual representations (Brewin et al., 2010).
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These two types of representation are typically integrated into a complete whole of perceptual,
and conceptual, information. However, when experiencing extreme stress, DRT assumes that
encoding is disrupted such that a “decoupling” occurs between perceptual processing and
conceptual processing. Brewin and colleagues describe the decoupling processes as a downregulation of the episodic memory system during the traumatic experience, which occurs in the
service of enhancing the encoding of survival-related perceptual representations, particularly
information related to external sensations and affective states. As a cost of this down-regulation,
perceptual information will not be adequately elaborated or contextualized within one’s
autobiographical memory. The decoupling of these two processing streams results in the
coupled problems of weak voluntary event memory (i.e., episodes that lack of sensory content)
and strong involuntary perceptual event memory (i.e., sensory content that lacks conceptual
context). The main clinical implication of DRT is that these memory problems will persist until
a clinical intervention facilitates the integration of perceptual representations and conceptual
representations.

Evidence of Peritraumatic Encoding Disruption (PED) Hypothesis

To date, no empirical studies have assessed whether or not encoding processes as
measured moment-to-moment are indeed disrupted during an analog stressful experience and if
this disruption results in memory disturbance. However, many studies have investigated PED
using indirect methods. Specifically, two major strands of research include (a) studies that use
laboratory methods to induce encoding disruption and assess its effect on memory disturbance,
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and (b) studies that measure peritraumatic dissociation as a proxy for encoding disruption and
assess its effect on memory disturbance. Before reviewing each of these strands of research, the
stressful film paradigm (SFP) will be reviewed because nearly all studies examining PED,
including the current study, have used this analog approach.

Stressful Film Paradigm

The SFP method involves exposing nonclinical samples to film clips with highly aversive
content. Materials typically include aversive scenes from commercially produced film (e.g.,
sexual assault dramatization; Kindt, van den Hout, & Buck, 2005; Schaich, Watkins, & Ehring,
2013) or real world footage (e.g., a collage of motor vehicle accidents; Brewin & Saunders,
2001; Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002; Holmes et al., 2004). The methodological benefits of the
SFP are (a) controlling the dose and nature of the index event and (b) allowing measurement of
participant reactions both during exposure and prospectively. Recent reviews generally support
its validity and utility (Holmes, 2004; Holmes & Bourne, 2008; Holmes & Steel, 2004;
Weidmann, Conradi, Gröger, Fehm, & Fydrich, 2009).
Given that ethical standards encumber attempts to induce truly traumatic responses
within the laboratory, ecological support of the SFP is provided by studies demonstrating that
participants exhibit reactions that are likely to occur during real world traumatic experiences.
Studies have successfully used the SFP to elicit a variety of stress reactions including changes in
overall stress levels (Holmes et al., 2004), state anxiety levels (Halligan et al., 2002; Holmes et
al., 2004), state dissociation levels (Holmes et al., 2004; Kindt et al., 2005), electrodermal
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activity (Kindt & van den Hout, 2003; Kindt et al., 2005), and heart rate (Holmes et al., 2004).
In addition, studies have successfully used the SFP to elicit intrusive memories (e.g., Davies &
Clark, 1998; Holmes et al., 2004; Laposa & Alden, 2006), which many consider to be the
hallmark symptom of PTSD (Foa et al., 1989; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). These PTSD-like reactions
to the SFP tend to not last longer than several hours and the frequency of intrusive memories
typically declines markedly within several days (Butler, Wells, & Dewick, 1995).

Laboratory-Induced Encoding Disruption

In recent years, over a dozen studies have used the SFP to investigate PED by comparing
a laboratory-induced encoding disruption condition to a control condition. Encoding disruption
is typically executed by introducing a concurrent cognitive task that consumes working memory
resources, namely visuospatial or phonological processing load (Baddeley, 1986). The
interruption of working memory processes during encoding of a stressful event is seen as a risk
factor to develop PTSD (Brewin et al., 2010). It should be noted, however, that deficits in
working memory abilities have also been identified as risk factors that operate after initial
encoding. For instance, low working memory capacity has been linked to the inability to
suppress intrusive memories (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). Therefore, manipulations to working
memory within the lab may not fully account for the relationship between working memory and
analog symptoms of PTSD.
Studies that induce encoding disruption have most frequently demonstrated significant
findings for the PED hypothesis in the context of involuntary memory problems, not voluntary
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memory problems (Brewin, 2014). The most frequently replicated finding is that a concurrent
visuospatial task leads to a reduction in subsequent involuntary recollections of stressful stimuli
relative to a control condition that does not involve a concurrent load task (Bourne et al., 2010,
Experiment 1; Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes et al., 2004, Experiments 1 and 2; Krans,
Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2010a, 2010b; Logan & O’Kearney, 2012; Stuart, Holmes, &
Brewin, 2006). This effect has been replicated when visuospatial tasks (e.g., playing “Tetris”)
are administered after the initial encoding, with delays of 0 minutes (Deeprose et al., 2012,
Experiment 1), 30 minutes (Deeprose et al., 2012, Experiment 2; Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, &
Deeprose, 2009; Holmes, James, Kilford, & Deeprose, 2010, Experiment 1), and 240 minutes
(Holmes et al., 2010, Experiment 2).
Findings related to the effects of a concurrent verbal task (e.g., counting backwards) have
been less consistent. Specifically, this method has been shown to result in increases of intrusions
(Bourne et al., 2010, Experiments 1 and 2; Deeprose, Zhang, DeJong, Dalgleish, & Holmes,
2012, Experiments 1 and 2; Holmes et al., 2004, Experiment 3), decreases in intrusions (Krans,
Näring, & Becker, 2009; Logan & O’Kearney, 2012; Pearson & Sawyer, 2011), as well as no
effect on intrusions (Krans, Langner, Reinecke, & Pearson, 2013). The source of unreliability
may be the variability with which participants are able to successfully execute the counting
backwards task, as better performance has been shown to positively predict intrusions (Bourne et
al., 2010). However, mixed findings are also evident in other concurrent verbal tasks such as
rehearsing a nine-digit number (Nixon, Cain, Nehmy, & Seymour, 2009a; Nixon, Nehmy, &
Seymour, 2007), counting from one to six (Krans et al., 2010a), and the computer game “Pub
Quiz” (Holmes et al., 2010, Experiments 1 and 2).
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Most studies examining PED in the context of involuntary memory problems have also
examined voluntary memory problems. However, the majority of tests on voluntary memory
have produced non-significant results. When using a cued recall task (i.e., open-ended questions
regarding the stimulus, such as, “How many people were put into coffins?”), most studies have
found null findings (Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes et al., 2004, Experiments 1, 2, and 3;
Nixon et al., 2007, 2009a). However, some studies found significant decreases in voluntary
recall if the participants counted backwards (Bourne et al., 2010, Experiment 1; Krans et al.,
2009, 2010a) or, contrary to predictions, engaged in a spatial tapping task (Krans et al., 2010b).
When using a sequencing recall task (i.e., ordering a list of verbally described events in the same
sequence as the stimulus), one study found significant decreases in sequencing recall if
rehearsing a nine-digit number (Nixon et al., 2007) and another found null results (Nixon et al.,
2009a). When using a recognition task (i.e., closed-ended questions regarding the stimulus, such
as, “The rapist kicks her twice [true/false]”), most studies found null results (Bourne et al., 2010,
Experiment 1; Deeprose et al., 2012, Experiment 2; Holmes et al., 2004, Experiment 3, 2009;
2010, Experiments 1 and 2; Krans et al., 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Nixon et al., 2007, 2009a).
However, some studies have found significant decreases in recognition performance if the
participants counted backwards (Bourne et al., 2010, Experiment 2) or, contrary to predictions,
engaged in a spatial tapping task (Holmes et al., 2004, Experiment 2).
In sum, studies that have investigated PED by incorporating laboratory-induced encoding
disruption have found consistent support for the buffering effects of a visuospatial distractor on
involuntary memory problems, but not voluntary memory problems. With respect to harmful
effects of a verbal distractor, studies found inconsistent or null findings for both involuntary
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memory problems and voluntary memory problems. The inconsistency of laboratory-induced
encoding disruption may be attributed to poor ecological validity, as encoding disruption during
real world stressful experiences seems to be more likely to occur organically through affective
and dissociative responses. Specifically, the ecological validity is suspect given (a) the demand
of concurrent tasks on overall cognitive load and (b) the misrepresentation of how encoding
might actually be disrupted during stressful experiences (i.e., not counting backwards or tapping
a complex pattern into a matrix). To better understand how memory disturbance may result from
processes associated with initial encoding, new methods are needed that use relatively less
demanding procedures to assess moment-to-moment encoding processes and allow the
experimenter to assess ecologically plausible contributors to encoding disruption (e.g., state
anxiety and state dissociation).

Peritraumatic Dissociation as a Proxy for Encoding Disruption

Some studies have investigated the PED hypothesis by using theoretical proxies assumed
to disrupt encoding processes, namely state dissociation (Buck, Kindt, & van den Hout, 2006;
Kindt et al., 2005; Kindt & van den Hout, 2003). Rather than measure encoding processes
directly, these studies assume that encoding disruption is the underlying mechanism of the
relationship between affective or dissociative responses and subsequent memory disturbance.
This assumption is problematic because the validity of the causal role of peritraumatic
dissociation on trauma-related symptomatology is questionable (Bremner, 2010; Candel &
Merckelbach, 2004; Giesbrecht, Lynn, Lilienfeld, & Merckelbach, 2008, 2010). Dissociation as

17
a construct has been criticized as being too broad (e.g., Holmes et al., 2005), whereas to claim a
person experienced peritraumatic dissociation seems to suggest little beyond some unspecified
psychological dysfunction during exposure.
To date, the empirical findings linking peritraumatic dissociation to memory disturbance
are mixed (Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012). Cross-sectional studies using trauma-exposed
samples have found higher levels of retrospectively reported peritraumatic dissociation to be
related to higher ratings of memory fragmentation (Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003;
Hardy, Young, & Holmes, 2009; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002). However, these studies are
limited in that only subjective perceptions of fragmentation were assessed (i.e., “meta-memory
judgments”), which can be biased by (a) cues during recall and (b) one’s history of recalling the
memory, as well as (c) current psychological functioning. Consistent with this criticism, all
laboratory studies that have attempted to use peritraumatic dissociation as a proxy for encoding
disruption have found that it predicts subjectively measured memory quality (i.e., metamemory), but not objectively measured memory quality (Buck et al., 2006; Kindt et al., 2005;
Kindt & van den Hout, 2003). While peritraumatic dissociation may not be a useful proxy of
encoding disruption, the empirical question remains if peritraumatic dissociation directly impacts
encoding processes. Methodologies are needed to assess moment-to-moment encoding
processes to examine the extent to which dissociative and affective responses do indeed disrupt
encoding and if such a disruption results in a meaningful impact on memory outcomes.
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Summary

A defining characteristic of PTSD is memory disturbance, most notably strong
involuntary trauma memories and weak voluntary trauma memories. Several theoretical
accounts assume PTSD begins with some type of disruption during the initial encoding of the
traumatic experience (i.e., the PED hypothesis). However, the empirical support for these
theoretical accounts is limited by not assessing moment-to-moment behavioral data that can
closely approximate actual encoding processes. The most adequate tests of the PED hypothesis
should use methods that do not induce encoding disruption but rather measure moment-tomoment irregularities in encoding processes that occur organically. Cognitive science has
recently provided one such method of moment-to-moment assessment that has shown high
degrees of reliability and validity: event segmentation.

Event Segmentation

The world we experience is a continuous stream of information falling upon our senses.
Yet, we do not seem to perceive or remember the world as a continuous stream but rather a
contiguous series of discrete events. An event is defined as “a segment of time at a given
location that is conceived by an observer to have a beginning and an end” (Zacks & Tversky,
2001, p. 17). Although an event is a construct of the mind, its boundaries coincide with
perceptible changes in the natural world (Tversky & Zacks, 2013). The moment-to-moment
perception of experience as discrete units simplifies and streamlines our understanding of our
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complex world as we move through it by condensing extended lengths of activity into single
elements (Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Newtson, 1973). This facet of encoding seems to directly
affect memory for our experiences (Sargent et al., 2013), as well as observational learning
(Lozano, Hard, & Tversky, 2006). Specifically, the locations of boundaries between events
affect how ongoing activity is remembered (Boltz, 1992; Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011; Schwan &
Garsoffky, 2004; Schwan, Garsoffky, & Hesse, 2000; Swallow et al., 2011; Swallow, Zacks, &
Abrams, 2009). A review of event segmentation is provided below, including its empirical
evidence and potential applicability to the PED hypothesis.

Psychological Theory of Event Segmentation

The human cognitive system has a variety of “chunking mechanisms” to enhance
processing efficiency (Gobet et al., 2001; Miller, 1956; Newell & Simon, 1972). How and why
do humans chunk ongoing experience into events? According to event segmentation theory
(EST; Zacks et al., 2007), the parsing of incoming data is a result of a persistent anticipation of
the immediate future. More specifically, event segmentation is a spontaneous concomitant (or
“byproduct”) of an ongoing perceptual processing system that transforms current sensory input
into perceptual predictions that allow the organism to anticipate incoming future stimuli. As
such, EST is one of many contemporary theories centered on the notion that cognitive systems
(e.g., language comprehension and reinforcement learning) serve anticipatory functions (Zacks,
Kurby, Eisenberg, & Haroutunian, 2011). To understand the EST perspective on how humans
segment events and why this ability is important in daily functioning and memory, one must
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consider event segmentation in the context of EST’s proposed perceptual processing system (see
Figure 1).

Anticipation of future
sensory inputs

Error detection

Perceptual processing
Event model

Event knowledge

Sensory input

Figure 1. Schematic depiction of event segmentation theory (EST).

Components of Event Segmentation

According to the EST model proposed by Zacks et al. (2007), our experiences are
understood in the context of event models, defined as representations maintained by working
memory of what is happening in the moment. The content of the event models eventually gets
incorporated into a long-term memory representation of the unfolding event. Event models are
multimodal (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile) and are often accessible to consciousness.
Importantly, in addition to receiving input from sensory and perceptual processes, event models
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receive input in a top-down fashion (i.e., conceptual processing) based on event knowledge (or
event schemas), defined as semantic memory representations of previously learned features of
specific domains (e.g., using a vending machine) and generalized domains (e.g., activities of
daily living). Event models can be stable for a period of time (ranging from a few seconds to
tens of minutes) and not affected by transient changes or disruptions in the sensory input (see the
“gated” arrow in Figure 1). Insensitivity to immediate sensory and perceptual input allows the
event model to guide perceptual processing. Specifically, the current event model facilitates
anticipatory processes by offering predictions for what might happen in the immediate future.
The accuracy of anticipatory processes is dependent upon how well the event model
matches the actual state of affairs within the current environment, which is monitored by an
error detection mechanism (neuroanatomical candidate: midbrain dopaminergic system; see
Zacks et al., 2011). When the contents of an event model do not match the perceptual features of
incoming stimuli (e.g., when the man suddenly stops walking down the hallway next to a
vending machine), there is a transient increase in prediction error signals emitted by the error
detection mechanism (see the segmented arrow in Figure 1). These prediction error signals
activate a gating mechanism that allows new sensory and perceptual input to update the event
model in a bottom-up fashion (i.e., perceptual processing; see the dashed black line in Figure 1).
As the event model is updated and becomes stable (e.g., the man is putting coins into the vending
machine), prediction error signals will reduce and the gating mechanism will be deactivated,
thereby reducing the influence of sensory inputs on the event model. It is also at this time that
the episodic memory for the larger event gets updated in long-term memory so that it now
contains contents of the prior event model (e.g., the man walked down the hallway and then
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made a purchase at the vending machine). Thus, the status of an event model perpetually
alternates between periods of stability and change that are perceived as events and event
boundaries, respectively.
To date, EST has been used primarily to explain how humans chunk everyday activities
(e.g., taking out the garbage) into meaningful events. For example, when observing a person
take out the garbage, EST predicts that observers will normatively segment and encode the
following events: pulling out the trash bag from the kitchen’s trash bin, carrying the trash bag to
the garage, placing the trash bag within the large garbage can, dragging the garbage can to the
street curb, and walking back to the house without the garbage can. Given that the current event
model may not afford fully accurate visuospatial predictions (e.g., the first few steps into the
garage), this ongoing activity will be segmented into events on a fine-grained scale due to
changes in location and physical movement (e.g., walking in kitchen, walking in garage, walking
in driveway). That is, prediction error signals will emit when incoming visuospatial information
is not sufficiently anticipated by the current event model, causing the gating mechanism to open
and thereby facilitate the construction of a new event model that can account for the new
visuospatial information. However, perceptual predictions are based on multiple, hierarchical
event models that are updated simultaneously on differently grained representational timescales
that are tuned to detect particular characteristics of prediction error signals. Therefore, observers
are also expected to segment the entire “taking out the garbage” sequence as a single, coarsegrained event because at a conceptual level all actions are highly predictable and based on the
same superordinate goal (i.e., taking out the garage). While the fine-grained event will contain
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more details from the stream of activity, the coarse-grained event will be more meaningful and
more likely to be intentionally recalled.

Perceptual Processes and Conceptual Processes

Event segmentation is predominantly constrained by perceptual, bottom-up processes
(Zacks et al., 2007). Physical changes in the environment are expected to stimulate segmentation
by increasing the potential for prediction error. For example, studies have shown that movement
of physical objects correlates with the perception of event boundaries (Hard, Tversky, & Lang,
2006; Newtson, Engquist, & Bois, 1977), especially when the observer is motivated to detect
fine-grained characteristics or when the physical objects move without intentionality (Zacks,
2004).
In comparison to bottom-up constraints to segmentation, less is currently known about
top-down constraints. Intuition suggests that human observers leverage memory stores when
making sense of their environment, rather than simply tracking changes in the environment like a
motion-activated security camera (e.g., Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard,
2005). Thus, a case can be made that event knowledge (e.g., episodic memory, semantic
knowledge, scripts, and schemas) can affect the identification of event boundaries. Specifically,
event knowledge may influence the identification of event boundaries (or lack thereof) in an
indirect fashion by constructing event models with situational features that have not yet been
perceived. When event knowledge constructs an event model that closely mirrors the actual
environment, perceptual predictions are accurate and, thus, the event model does not need to be
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updated by additional sensory input. However, when event knowledge is inaccurate or
insufficiently matches the current state of affairs, the observer’s event model will need to be
updated more frequently by sensory input in a bottom-up fashion. More frequent updating
results in a greater number of identified event boundaries (Zacks, 2004). Also, in situations for
which event knowledge does not adequately construct event models, the resulting memory
representation may include perceptual information that is not integrated in a conceptually
coherent manner, as event knowledge can inform how smaller events are arranged within a larger
event (e.g., Zacks et al., 2007).
To date, the indirect role of event knowledge on segmentation (through the conduit of
event model construction) is most clearly illustrated by studies investigating the top-down
process of agent goal knowledge (Boggia & Ristic, 2015; Magliano, Taylor, & Kim, 2005;
Speer, Zacks, & Reynolds, 2007; Zacks, 2004). For example, Magliano and Zacks (2011)
showed that discontinuity edits in film, which by definition should be unpredictable, are more
likely to be identified as event boundaries if the given edit depicts a discontinuation of goaldirected behavior rather than just visual information. However, evidence does not yet
demonstrate an interaction between segmentation and individual differences in event knowledge
(Sargent et al., 2013).
In addition to the potential influence of event knowledge on the segmentation system,
another top-down determinant of segmentation may be the observer’s own goals and attentional
engagement (Zack & Swallow, 2007; Zacks et al., 2007). People approach experiences in widely
differing manners. To list just a few examples, they may be motivated to learn, evaluate, avoid,
ignore, or be entertained. Their own goals may impact how they regulate attention. In fact,
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studies have shown that situational demands can influence a participant to change strategies
during an event segmentation task (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). Although attentional engagement
with an experience can vary across persons and situations, no studies have examined how event
segmentation processes may change as a function of the emotionally evocative qualities of a
situation. The current study takes the first steps in this direction by examining the extent to
which affective responses influence event segmentation processes.

Measurement of Event Segmentation

The primary method to assess event segmentation is the event segmentation task
(Newtson, 1973). In this simple procedure, participants watch a film and press a button each
time they consciously perceive a boundary between meaningful events. Task instructions vary
between studies. Some iterations request the identification of the largest units of activity (i.e.,
course-grained), while other iterations request the identification of the smallest units of activity
(i.e., fine-grained). The latter has been shown to be more reliable (Sargent et al., 2013).
With respect to reliability, the event segmentation task has strong inter-rater indices and
test-retest indexes with respect to the identification of boundary locations and event durations
(Newtson, 1976; Speer, Swallow, & Zacks, 2003; Zacks et al., 2006). With respect to predictive
validity, recent studies have shown that the event segmentation task can identify predicted group
differences (e.g., elderly vs. controls) in the segmentation of non-stressful events, as well as
event memory in the predicted, positive direction during non-stressful events (Bailey et al., 2013;
Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013; Zacks et al., 2006; Zacks, Kurby, Landazabal,
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Krueger, & Grafman, 2016). Stimuli used in event segmentation research are carefully
considered and no prior studies have used the event segmentation task in the context of a
stressful experience. Differences in stimuli can elicit varied segmentation performances based
on intrapersonal characteristics. For instance, studies have shown that, as predicted, previously
established group differences (e.g., elderly vs. controls) in event segmentation performance in
everyday experiences are not generalizable to narrative experiences (Kurby, Asiala, & Millis,
2013; Magliano, Kopp, McNerney, Radvansky, & Zacks, 2012).
With respect to ecological validity, evidence suggests this paradigm does not introduce
task demands that substantially alter naturalistic perceptual processing. Specifically, Zacks et al.
(2001) recorded brain activity using fMRI while participants passively watched films of
everyday activities. Next, without fMRI measurement, participants identified event boundaries
on the same films using the event segmentation task on two timescales (i.e., fine- and coarsegrained instructions). During the initial passive viewing, transient increases in activity of
predicted brain areas (posterior and frontal cortex) coincided with event boundaries identified
during the event segmentation tasks, especially for boundaries identified on the coarse-grained
timescale. Specifically, brain activity (a) increased several seconds before each boundary and
(b) peaked several seconds after each boundary. Due to the ordering of the study’s procedures,
changes in brain activity during passive viewing cannot be attributed to subsequent task
demands. In addition to supporting the ecological validity of the event segmentation task, these
findings provide evidence that event segmentation is a normal, spontaneous, and effortless
perceptual process (see also, Speer et al., 2007).

27
While segmentation can be measured several ways on the event segmentation task, one
approach is to calculate an agreement score, defined as the degree to which one indicates event
boundaries that are consistent with an objective standard based on theoretically identified event
boundaries (Kurby et al., 2013; Magliano et al., 2005, 2012). Although the process of event
segmentation is inherently subjective and idiographic to the person-situation transaction,
research has demonstrated that theoretically identified event boundaries are robust predictors of
event segmentation (Kurby et al., 2013; Zacks et al., 2009). For example, people perceive event
boundaries at the beginning and end of goal oriented action sequences (Magliano et al., 2005,
2012). Segmentation patterns that highly correlate with the pattern of theoretically identified
event boundaries are considered to be “systematic.” To exhibit unsystematic segmentation, one
must locate event boundaries at idiosyncratic locations that are not meaningful with respect to a
theoretically driven coding scheme. Thus, each button-press that deviates from the objective
standard likely indicates some faulty or inapt process within the individual.

Evidence of Event Segmentation Memory Effects

According to EST, the process of event segmentation directly affects event memory
(Zacks et al., 2007). Specifically, each time an event model is updated, the previous event model
is replaced by the new event model in working memory or short-term memory and subsequently
encoded into long-term memory. These encoded units allow the individual to compress large
spans of information into semantic chunks (e.g., walking through a hallway, putting coins into a
vending machine, pushing a button, grabbing a soda, walking back through a hallway). Indeed,
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strong empirical evidence supports the direct link between event segmentation and event
memory (e.g., Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013).
The perception of event boundaries seems to be the key mechanism for what information
is encoded and how the information is organized in memory (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011;
Radvansky, 2012). There is extensive research showing that details of events that occur around
event boundaries are remembered better than those that occur within the boundaries (Boltz,
1992; Speer & Zacks, 2005; Schwan & Garsoffky, 2004; Schwan et al., 2000; Swallow et al.,
2011; Swallow, et al., 2009; Zacks et al, 2006). Thus, identifying the “appropriate” event
boundaries, which can be seen as “long-term memory anchors,” can enhance encoding efficiency
and the quality of a memory for a given experience (Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Zacks & Swallow,
2007). Event boundaries are considered appropriate if they cue the updating of the event model
only when necessary. For example, when watching a man walk down a hallway to a vending
machine, the cessation of his walking is a more appropriate event boundary than him passing
underneath a fluorescent light bulb while still walking toward the vending machine.

Event Segmentation and the PED Hypothesis

Given that the PED hypothesis assumes that an important antecedent to the development
of PTSD is aberrant encoding caused by stressful responding (i.e., predominance of perceptual
processing over conceptual processing), research is needed to examine the relationship between
moment-to-moment encoding processes and relevant memory characteristics (e.g., weak
voluntary memory). This research objective may profit from the emerging empirical literature
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on event segmentation, given the assumption that any substantial disruption to peritraumatic
encoding processes should be observable within the context of basic mechanisms of event
perception. The event segmentation task can be incorporated into the SFP to provide a momentto-moment marker of encoding, thereby permitting the examination of the theorized relationship
between anxiety- and dissociation-impacted encoding and memory outcomes (e.g., reduced
recall and recognition).
Three deterrents of systematicity in event segmentation during a stressful experience are
anticipated. These deterrents may not be purely distinct but offer a framework to consider how
“encoding disruption” may manifest in the context of an event segmentation task (i.e., low
segmentation systematicity). First, the most obvious and plausible cause of low segmentation
systematicity is diverting attentional focus away from aversive external sensations. This source
of low segmentation systematicity will be called “overt attentional avoidance.” If one does not
visually track an unfolding activity, one loses useful information to construct event models and
identify event boundaries. Second, given that insufficient prior event knowledge requires the
event segmentation system to rely more heavily on perceptual information when updating event
models (Zack, 2004), systematicity may diminish to the extent that the individual possesses little
or inaccurate prior event knowledge of the stressful experience. This source of low segmentation
systematicity will be called “insufficient prior event knowledge.” Third, given that affective
responses (e.g., state anxiety and state dissociation) have been shown to bias attention toward
perceptual (bottom-up) processing and away from conceptual (top-down) processing (e.g.,
Brewin, Ma, & Colson, 2013; Brewin & Mersaditabari, 2013; Morgan, Doran, Steffian, Hazlett,
& Southwick, 2006; Pacheco-Unguetti, Acosta, Callejas, & Lupiáñez, 2010; for theoretical
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accounts, see Brewin et al., 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Eysenck,
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), systematicity may diminish to the extent that an affectrelated shift away from conceptual processing interferes with the potential of event knowledge to
update event models. This source of low segmentation systematicity will be called “affectrelated attentional interference.”
Although not articulated by PTSD theories that support the PED hypothesis (Brewin et
al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000), low segmentation systematicity (or simply, “unsystematic
segmentation”) during a stressful experience can be viewed as a type of encoding disruption.
Given the three reasons stated above, event boundaries identified for a stressful experience, when
compared to a non-stressful experiences, may be less conceptually driven and more perceptually
driven. Since sensory information near event boundaries should be most salient in memory
(Radvansky, 2012), the representation may be initially encoded as highly aversive snapshots and
sound bites that are not meaningfully integrated together. This imbalance of perceptual
information over conceptual information resonates with cognitive theories of PTSD (Brewin et
al., 1996, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).

Summary

In order to understand how individuals comprehend events, including traumatic events,
one should consider the role of event segmentation, described as the coordination of perceptual
processes and conceptual processes to chunk unfolding streams of information into a hierarchical
structure of smaller units (Zacks et al., 2007). Given that memories of experiences are
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influenced by how the experiences are segmented (Sargent et al., 2013), it is anticipated that
segmenting an event unsystematically will lead to poor voluntary memory. In the context of
traumatic experiences, there are several possible sources of unsystematic event segmentation,
including overt attentional avoidance, insufficient prior event knowledge, and affect-related
attentional interference. The event segmentation task (Newtson, 1973) provides an opportunity
to measure event segmentation as a non-invasive, moment-to-moment marker of encoding
disruption, which opens the possibility of examining the theoretical foundations of the PED
hypothesis within a controlled laboratory setting.

CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES

Overview of the Current Study

In this study, healthy participants engaged in the event segmentation task while viewing a
non-stressful film and a stressful film. State anxiety and state dissociation were measured with
self-report questionnaires before and after the stressful film. Ten minutes after the stressful film,
event recall and then event recognition was assessed. Several variables were assessed as
potential controls in regression analyses. One potential control was self-report of the extent to
which the participant overtly avoided attentional engagement with the films (e.g., closing or
covering eyes). Another potential statistical control was self-reported familiarity with the genre
of the stressful stimulus (i.e., “torture porn”). Lastly, another potential statistical control was
domain-specific event knowledge of the stressful experience (i.e., male-to-female rape), which
was assessed by collecting “rape scripts” and coding for empirically identified “typical rape
themes.”
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Hypotheses

The overarching PED hypothesis makes four logically sequenced assumptions: (1)
encoding disruption occurs during stressful experiences, (2) stress responses such as anxiety and
dissociation predict encoding disruption, (3) encoding disruption predicts memory disturbance,
and (4) encoding disruption is a mediating mechanism by which stress responses such as anxiety
and dissociation cause memory disturbance. In the current study, these assumptions were
viewed as four separate hypotheses. The a priori operationalization of encoding disruption was
low segmentation agreement scores (i.e., “low segmentation systematicity”).

Hypothesis 1: Encoding Disruption Occurs During Stressful Experiences

It was hypothesized that encoding processes operate more unsystematically during
stressful experiences than non-stressful experiences. The current study tested this hypothesis
using event segmentation as a moment-to-moment indicator of one encoding process during a
non-stressful experience (Big Night) and a potentially stressful experience (Irréversible).
H1:

Event segmentation is less systematic during stressful events than non-stressful
events.
Prediction 1: Segmentation agreement scores will be lower for the stressful film
than the non-stressful film.
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Hypothesis 2: Stress Responses Predict Peritraumatic Encoding Disruption

It was hypothesized that reduced systematicity in encoding processes during stressful
experiences is a direct result of stress responses (anxiety and dissociation). The current study
tested this hypothesis using event segmentation as a moment-to-moment indicator of one
encoding process during a potentially stressful experience (Irréversible).
H2:

The more one experiences stress responses (anxiety and dissociation), the less
systematic segmentation will be.
Prediction 2: Segmentation agreement scores for the stressful film will be
negatively related to state anxiety and state dissociation (two
separate tests).

Hypothesis 3: Peritraumatic Encoding Disruption Predicts Event Memory Disturbance

It was hypothesized that encoding disruption during a stressful experience will negatively
predict voluntary memory of the experience (recall and recognition). The current study tested
this hypothesis using event segmentation as a moment-to-moment indicator of one encoding
process during a potentially stressful experience (Irréversible).
H3:

Unsystematic event segmentation during a stressful event results in poorer
voluntary memory of the experience (recall and recognition).
Prediction 3. Segmentation agreement scores during the stressful film will
positively predict voluntary recall and recognition (two separate tests).
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Hypothesis 4: Peritraumatic Encoding Disruption is a Mediating Mechanism by which Stress
Responses Cause Event Memory Disturbance

It was hypothesized that poor voluntary memory for stressful experiences will occur to
the extent that encoding processes are negatively influenced by stress responses (anxiety and
dissociation). The current study tested this hypothesis using event segmentation as a moment-tomoment indicator of one encoding process during a potentially stressful experience
(Irréversible).
H4:

Unsystematic event segmentation is an encoding mechanism by which stress
responses (anxiety and dissociation) leads to poor event recall and recognition.
As such, stress responses (anxiety and dissociation) cause memory disturbance
indirectly through unsystematic event segmentation.
Prediction 4. Segmentation agreement scores during the stressful film will
mediate the negative relationship between anxiety and dissociation
responses and voluntary recall and recognition (four separate
tests).

CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY

Participants

Recruitment and Setting

Participants of all genders were recruited from PSYC 102 and compensated with course
credit. Participation registration was executed using a secure online experiment management
system (Sona Systems, Ltd.) where the study was advertised as “Understanding Stressful
Experiences” (see Appendix A for IRB-approved recruitment materials). Participation lasted
approximately 60 minutes. One trained research assistant guided each participant through nine
phases (see Appendix B for an outline of procedures). Participants often participated
simultaneously but in separate rooms within the same laboratory and without interacting. Each
room contained a desk, computer, and headphones.

Exclusionary Criteria

Exclusionary criteria included younger than 18 years of age, personal history of sexual
assault victimization (any age), probable PTSD, and prior exposure to stimuli. Given that at least
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71 participants were required to achieve adequate power to detect moderate effect sizes in the
planned mediation analyses (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007), participant recruitment continued until
data were collected from at least 71 participants who completed all measures and met full
inclusion criteria. In total, 177 participants were recruited. The final sample included 73
participants as 62 participants failed to meet inclusion criteria, 28 participants voluntarily
stopped the stressful film, eight participants did not follow segmentation task directions, four
participants could not complete the entire study due to scheduling conflicts, one participant
voluntarily withdrew from the rape script task, and one participant did not complete all measures.

Demographic Information

The final sample of 73 participants averaged 19.44 years of age (SD = 1.82) and were
predominantly freshman (75.3%), averaging 24.34 credit hours (SD = 28.94). Slightly over half
the participants identified as men (54.8%) with the remainder identifying as women. The vast
majority identified as heterosexual (97.3%) with the remainder identifying as homosexual. The
entire sample was fluent in English and 21.9% were multilingual. While the sample was racially
diverse, the majority identified as either of European descent (49.3%) or African descent
(30.1%). See Table 1 for a complete demographic summary.
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Table 1
Participant Demographics
Demographic Variable
Age

Class Standing

Gender
Sexual Orientation
Hispanic/Latino Heritage
Race

Languages Spoken

Percentage
31.5%
38.4%
13.7%
6.8%
2.7%
2.7%
0.0%
1.4%
1.4%
1.4%
75.3%
13.7%
5.5%
5.5%
54.8%
45.2%
97.3%
2.7%
79.5%
20.5%
49.3%
30.1%
5.5%
4.1%
2.7%
1.4%
1.4%
1.4%
4.1%
78.1%
11.0%
4.1%
1.4%
1.4%
1.4%
1.4%
1.4%

n
23
28
10
5
2
2
0
1
1
1
55
10
4
4
40
33
71
2
58
15
36
22
4
3
2
1
1
1
3
57
8
3
1
1
1
1
1

Description
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Freshman (0 – 30 Credit Hours)
Sophomore (31 – 60 Credit Hours)
Junior (61 – 90 Credit Hours)
Senior (91+ Credit Hours)
Male
Female
Heterosexual
Homosexual
No
Yes
European
African
European and Indigenous American
Indigenous American
Asian
African and Indigenous American
European and Asian
Middle Eastern
No Response
English Only
English and Spanish
English and Tigrinya or Twi or Swahili
English and Arabic
English and Chinese
English and Spanish and German
English and Urdu
English and Vietnamese
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Materials

Self-Report Measures

Before completing the script assessments, viewing and segmenting the films, and
completing memory assessments, participants completed a survey packet that included several
self-report measures. Later in the study, participants completed several pre- and post-film selfreport measures. See Appendix C for all self-report measures.
Prior Film Exposure Questionnaire (PFEQ). Within the initial survey packet, prior
exposure to two distinct film genres (“torture-porn” and “chick-flick”) was assessed using the
PFEQ, a 16-item self-report measure designed for the purposes of the current study. Tortureporn is a subgenre of horror films in which the central aspect of the plot is extreme violence
against helpless victims, often including sexual violence but not necessarily (Edelstein, 2006).
Chick-flick is a subgenre of comedy films and drama films that is explicitly marketed toward a
stereotyped female audience and includes a plot depicting romantic themes in adult heterosexual
relationships. The first 14 items of the PFEQ list seven representative films of each genre,
resulting in two seven-item scales. Response options include 0 (“I have never heard of it”), 1 (“I
have heard of it but I have never seen it”), 2 (“I have seen it only once”), and 3 (“I have seen it
more than once”). Responses for each scale were averaged to form indices of “prior torture-porn
exposure” (PFEQ-TP) and “prior chick-flick exposure” (PFEQ-CF). While the current study is
most interested in the potential confounding role of prior torture-porn exposure, the inclusion of
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a chick-flick scale was intended to mask the main purpose of the PFEQ and thereby reduce the
likelihood of a socially desirable response set. The PFEQ-TP scale demonstrated good internal
consistency (α = .74). Scores ranged from 2 to 16 with a mean of 7.53 (SD = 3.20) and nonnormal distribution with a positive skew of 0.62 (null skewness 95% CI [-0.55, 0.55]). Kurtosis
did not significantly differ from zero (null kurtosis 95% CI [-1.10, 1.10]).
In addition to assessing prior exposure to film genres, the fifteenth and sixteenth items
assessed prior exposure to the stressful stimuli (Irréversible; Chioua et al., 2002) and nonstressful stimuli (Big Night, Kirkpatrick et al., 1996), respectively. Participation discontinued if
either of the final two items indicated at least one prior viewing. As mentioned above, four
participants indicated a prior viewing of Irréversible and, thus, were excluded from continued
participation. Only one participant indicated a prior viewing of Big Night; this participant had
also previously seen Irréversible.
Life Events Checklist for DSM-5 (LEC-5). The initial survey packet also included the
LEC-5 (Weathers, Blake, et al., 2013), a 17-item screener for potentially traumatic events that
may have been experienced during the participant’s lifetime. Specifically, 16 common
antecedents of PTSD are listed, along with an additional item that assesses any other potentially
traumatic event that was not already listed. In addition, nine follow-up questions assess which
previously indicated event was the “worst,” along with a variety of characteristics of the event
(e.g., when it happened, if it reoccurred, and if injury or death was involved). Psychometric
information is not currently available; however, given the minimal revisions from the
psychometrically acceptable original version (Gray, Litz, Hsu, & Lombardo, 2004), the authors
do not anticipate diminished reliability or validity. Participants were screened-out of the current
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study using two items on the LEC-5 that assess lifetime history of sexual assault victimization or
other unwanted sexual contact. With anticipation that the contents of the study’s materials might
remind some participants of previous traumatic experiences and result in especially high stress
levels (Pfefferbaum, Pfefferbaum, North, & Neas, 2002), participants answering these two LEC5 items as “happened to me,” “witnessed it,” or “not sure” were automatically advanced to
debriefing after completing the survey packet. Forty-one of the 176 participants who completed
the LEC-5 (23.3%) were excluded based on their responses (i.e., events involving sexual
assault).
PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5). The initial survey packet then included the PCL-5
(Weathers, Litz, et al., 2013), a 20-item survey that assesses all representative PTSD symptoms
included within DSM-5 diagnostic criteria. The PCL-5 is intended to screen individuals for
PTSD and provide provisional PTSD diagnoses. When completing the PCL-5, participants are
instructed to respond to each item while keeping in mind the “worst event” specified on the
LEC-5. Each item specifies a PTSD symptom and uses a five-point rating scale: Not at all (0), A
little bit (1), Moderately (2), Quite a bit (3), and Extremely (4). Similar to the LEC-5, although
psychometric information is not currently available, it is closely similar to psychometrically
acceptable original version (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993). Preliminary
validation research suggests a cut-point of 38 to indicate probable PTSD, though the current
study used a conservative cut-point of 30. As reported above, 37 of the 176 participants who
completed the PCL-5 (21.0%) were excluded based on their responses. In the final sample, PCL5 scores ranged from 0 to 28 with a mean of 9.37 (SD = 7.91) and the distribution was non-
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normal with a positive skew of 0.64 (null skewness 95% CI [-0.55, 0.55]) and the minimum
score (i.e., zero) as the modal response. Internal consistency was good (α = .84).
Demographic Questionnaire (DQ). Lastly, within the initial survey packet, demographic
information was assessed using the DQ, a 7-item self-report measure that was created for the
purposes of the current study. The DQ contains items assessing age, gender, Hispanic/Latino
ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, credit hours, and languages spoken. Descriptive statistics are
reported above (Table 1).
State Trait Anxiety Index – State, 6-Item Version (STAI-S6). Immediately before and
after the stressful film, state anxiety was measured with the STAI-S6 (Marteau & Bekker, 1992),
an abbreviated version of the original scale (Spielberger et al., 1970). The STAI-S6 has good
internal reliability and construct validity (Marteau & Bekker, 1992; Tluczek, Henriques, &
Brown, 2009). In the final sample, STAI-S6 Time One (T1) scores ranged from 6 to 15 with a
mean of 8.52 (SD = 2.30). Internal consistency was acceptable (α = .67). The sample’s STAI-S6
T1 scores did not approximate a normal distribution with a positive skew of 0.78 (null skewness
95% CI [-0.55, 0.55]). The STAI-S6 Time Two (T2) scores ranged from 6 to 24 with a mean of
16.16 (SD = 4.76) in a normal distribution. Internal consistency was good (α = .90).
Peritraumatic Dissociative Experience Questionnaire, 7-Item Version (PDEQ-7).
Immediately before and after the stressful film, state dissociation was assessed using the PDEQ7, a shortened version of the original 10-item self-report measure (Marmar, Weiss, & Metzler,
1997) used commonly by trauma analog studies (e.g., Kindt & van den Hout, 2003). Item
content includes altered time perception, depersonalization, and derealization. Several items of
the original version were removed due to being incompatible with trauma analog studies (e.g.,

43
“What was happening seemed unreal to me, like I was in a dream, or watching a movie or play”).
The core measure consistently shows good internal reliability (Kindt & van den Hout, 2003;
Marmar et al., 1994; Zoellner, Alvarez-Conrad, & Foa, 2002) and construct validity, as it
positively predicts posttraumatic stress symptoms (Marmar et al., 1994), laboratory intrusions
(Laposa & Rector, 2012), and subjective judgments of memory fragmentation (Engelhard, van
den Hout, Kindt, Arntz, & Schouten, 2003; Hardy et al., 2009; Kindt & van den Hout, 2003;
Kindt et al., 2005). During the pre-film state measurement, participants were asked to respond to
the PDEQ-7 with regard to the previously viewed stimulus, which, depending on
counterbalanced condition was either the practice film (i.e., building a toy boat using Legos) or
Big Night. In the final sample, PDEQ-7 T1 scores ranged from 7 to 18 with a mean of 9.89 (SD
= 2.64). Internal consistency was poor (α = .52). The sample’s PDEQ-7 T1 scores were nonnormally distributed with positive skewness of 0.89 (null skewness 95% CI [-0.55, 0.55]). The
sample’s PDEQ-7 Time 2 (T2) scores ranged from 7 to 23 with a mean of 10.62 (SD = 3.71).
The sample’s PDEQ-7 T2 scores were non-normally distributed with a positive skew of 1.21
(null skewness 95% CI [-0.55, 0.55]). Internal consistency was acceptable (α = .67).
Cognitive, Affective, and Visual Engagement Assessment Tests (CAVEAT).
Immediately after both films, the CAVEAT was administered to assess a variety of facets (i.e.,
“caveats”) related to viewer response. The CAVEAT is a 13-item measure made for the
purposes of this study in order to assess a variety of possible between-film differences in viewer
response. Part one, Cognitive Engagement, asked the participant to estimate the extent to which
he or she paid attention to the film, experienced the perspective of the main character (omeletmaker in Big Night and victim in Irréversible), experienced empathy for the main character, and
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identified with the main character. Part two, Affective Engagement, asked the participant to
estimate the extent to which the film made him or her experience the five basic emotions of
anger, joy, sadness, disgust, and fear (i.e., Ekman, 2003). Part three, Visual Engagement,
included four items that asked the participant to estimate the number of times he or she looked
away from the screen, deliberately closed his or her eyes (i.e., not simply blinking), deliberately
covered his or her eyes, and the percentage of time he or she directly looked at the film. The
estimated percentage of looking at the screen provides an index of “level of attentiveness” to the
stressful film that could potentially be used as a statistical control. In Irréversible, slightly under
half the participants (49.3%) indicated looking at the screen for 100% of the film’s duration with
a range of 50% to 100% and a mean of 94.16% (SD = 9.04%) in a non-normal distribution
(skewness = -2.34, null skewness 95% CI [-0.55, 0.55]; kurtosis = 7.30, null kurtosis 95% CI [1.10, 1.10]).

Scripts Assessments

Script writing procedures were used to assess generalized event knowledge for everyday
experiences and domain-specific event knowledge for the stressful experience (i.e., sexual
assault). Participants were asked to first produce scripts for three everyday events: getting ready
for work, shopping for groceries, and going out to dinner. Three minutes were allowed for all
three scripts (i.e., approximately one minute per script). Next, participants were asked to
produce one script for a sexual assault within three minutes. The rape script assessment included
more detailed and prescriptive instructions than the everyday event script assessment because
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without some constraints the rape script assessment could produce widely heterogeneous
responses. Following previous research (e.g., Davies, Walker, Archer, & Pollard, 2013; Littleton
& Axsom, 2003; Ryan, 1988), participants were told to describe, in as much detail as possible, a
specific but hypothetical rape of a female victim by a male perpetrator including the events
leading up to the rape, during the rape, and after the rape, as well as characteristics of the victim
and the perpetrator. Participants were told to use their own idea about what rape means. Each
participant’s rape script was scored for the degree to which it resembled a “typical rape” script.
Also called a “real rape” script or a “blitz rape” script, a typical rape script is defined as a
domain-specific knowledge structure that includes the following general narrative: a single male
perpetrator derives sexual pleasure from unprotected penile penetration of an unknown, resisting,
solitary, female victim within a public place and with an extensive amount of violence, often
using a weapon (Ryan, 2011). See Appendix D for script assessment forms and scoring keys.

Stimuli

Participants segmented a 322-second non-stressful film (breakfast scene in Big Night;
Kirkpatrick, Filly, Scott, & Tucci, 1996) and a 322-second stressful film (male-to-female rape
scene in Irréversible; Chioua, Cassel, & Noé, 2002). Both films were commercially produced
and include one continuous shot with minimal zooming and panning. In recent years, several
studies have demonstrated the validity of the Irréversible rape scene as a stressful stimulus
within the SFP (Nixon et al., 2007; Nixon et al., 2009a, 2009b; Qin et al., 2012; Schaich,
Watkins, & Ehring, 2013). The empirical basis for using this scene is supported by a study that
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directly compared the effectiveness of the Irréversible rape scene to other commonly used
materials in the SFP (Weidmann et al., 2009). While most stressful stimuli are generally
successful in eliciting self-reported stress and memory disturbance, with effects lasting up to
three days, Weidmann and colleagues found the Irréversible rape scene to have the strongest and
most consistent effects on heart rate, anger, disgust, stress, and intrusive memories.
In addition to the empirical basis, the Irréversible rape scene was selected because it
satisfied several theoretically desirable qualities. First, in order to increase the likelihood that
participants would interpret the materials as personally relatable and logically plausible,
materials were sought that depicted commonly experienced traumatic events rather than
unbelievable situations such as those common to the gore genre. Specifically, materials were
sought that depicted adult sexual assault victimization because this type of experience presents
the highest risk for developing PTSD (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson 1995). The
Irréversible rape scene is realistic and depicts an interaction that fits any definition of violent
sexual assault. Second, in order to increase the likelihood that participants would be engaged in
the internal structure of the events, materials were sought that included a linear narrative rather
than a compilation of unconnected scenes and images (e.g., the commonly used compilation of
automobile accidents; Steil, 1996). The Irréversible rape scene has the following simple
narrative structure: a woman walks into a dark tunnel, a male stranger physically intercepts the
woman and threatens her with a knife, the man brutally assaults the woman (sexually and
physically) while she attempts to escape without success. Third, in order to simulate the
experience of witnessing a real life event, materials were sought that included long, continuous
shots with head-high perspectives and minimal zooming. Similarly, materials were sought that
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did not include many cinematic devices that aid segmentation such as fades, wipes, and changes
in luminance (Cutting, Brunick, & Candan, 2012). The Irréversible rape scene includes only one
shot with minimal camera movement. Fourth, in order to avoid the extent to which spoken
dialog may influence segmentation, materials were sought that included minimal dialog and/or a
non-English language. The Irréversible rape scene includes sporadic dialog in French without
subtitles. Also important but not a requirement during stimulus selection, evidence suggests no
gender differences with respect to reactions the Irréversible scene, which could reduce the
likelihood of gender-based confounds (Weidmann et al., 2009).
For the same reasons why the Irréversible rape scene is an effective stimulus in trauma
analog studies, some participants were expected to experience it as too distressing, even after
screening out those indicating prior sexual assault victimization and/or probable PTSD. To
mitigate this risk, participants were reminded that they could choose to stop the film at any time
by pressing the “stop button.” As reported above, of the 101 participants that started viewing the
film and met all other inclusionary criteria, 28 chose to discontinue (27.72%).
To explore potential systematic biases in the decision to stop the film, a series of
independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare participants who stopped the film to
participants who watched the entire film. Specifically, participants were compared on age, prior
exposure to “torture porn” films (PFEQ-TP), PTSD symptoms (PCL-5), script knowledge
(everyday events and sexual assaults), post-film state anxiety (STAI-S6) and state dissociation
(PDEQ-7), post-film emotions (anger, joy, sadness, disgust, and fear; CAVEAT), and level of
attentiveness (CAVEAT). To reduce the likelihood of a Type 1 Error resulting from 13
simultaneous comparisons, a Bonferroni correction was used to adjust the conventional .05 p-
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value to .004 (.05/13). Results indicate no statistically significant differences between groups
(stoppers vs. non-stoppers). However, non-significant trends indicate that stoppers may have
experienced greater state anxiety, anger, and disgust than non-stoppers and that non-stoppers
may have had greater exposure to the torture-porn film genre. See Table 12 in Appendix E for
results. In addition to these t-tests, chi-squared analyses indicate that participant gender did not
predict stopping the film, X2 (1, N = 101) = 0.568, p = .451, nor did racial identification as either
European-American, X2 (1, N = 101) = 0.771, p = .380, or African-American, X2 (1, N = 101) =
1.151, p = .283, which represent the vast majority of participants. Taken together, there were no
significant individual characteristic differences between non-stoppers and stoppers, though it is
possible that some participants stopped the film if they were unfamiliar with its content and/or if
they experienced the film as highly distressing (anxiety, anger, and disgust). While this
possibility would suggest a systematic bias in the final sample, the lack of significant effects
tempers this concern.
The order in which the stressful film and non-stressful film were presented was
counterbalanced, namely to rule-out practice effects of the segmentation task. Prior to entering
the lab, each participant was randomly assigned to either watch the stressful film first or the nonstressful film first. In the final sample, 38 participants (52.1%) saw the stressful film first and 35
saw the non-stressful film first (47.9%).
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Experimental Tasks

Event Segmentation

Participants were oriented to a desk with a computer monitor, keyboard, and closed
survey packet. Participants were introduced to the event segmentation task (Newtson, 1973) by
completing a practice trial using a film of an actor engaging in an everyday activity (i.e., building
a toy boat using Legos, 155 seconds; see Sargent et al., 2013). Participants did not receive
details about the practice film (or the upcoming films) and were not told if the scenes were real
or staged with actors. The film was presented on a 21-inch computer monitor placed two feet
from the seated participant. To simulate the experience of witnessing a real life event, the film
included one continuous shot from a fixed, head-high perspective with no change in lens zoom.
Participants were asked to segment the film by pressing a spacebar to indicate each boundary
between “meaningful units of activity.” Specifically, participants were told to indicate the
smallest units they found meaningful. If a given participant indicated fewer than six event
boundaries, the experimenter repeated the film and asked the participant to indicate “a few more”
(see Sargent et al., 2013). Prior to progressing to the next set of films, participants were
reminded that participation was voluntary and, therefore, they could discontinue watching any of
the films at any time without penalty. Participants were instructed that they could choose to stop
the film by pressing a button clearly marked “stop.” If a given participant pressed the button, he
or she immediately continued to the next phase of the study. See Appendix F for the
experimenter script for each administration of the event segmentation task.
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Memory Assessments

Event memory for the non-stressful and stressful films was assessed using a free recall
task. Following Sargent et al. (2013), to assess event recall, participants were asked to handwrite
for seven minutes everything that happened during each film in as much detail as possible and
using the same sequential order of actions (See Appendix G). Scoring procedures are described
in the Chapter 4 (Results) under the qualitative data coding section.
In addition, event memory for the stressful film was assessed using a recognition task.
Following procedures used in prior event segmentation research (e.g., Sargent et al., 2013), the
event recognition task included 20 trials in which the participant was asked to select one of two
images that he or she believed was taken from the film. Target images were screenshots from
the 322-second Irréversible clip and lure images were screenshots from other parts of
Irréversible using the same actors but not included within the short clip. Performance on this
task was scored through totaling the number of correctly recognized images. Higher scores
indicated better recognition. In the final sample, the mean recognition score was 16.79 (SD =
1.28) in a normal distribution ranging from 14 to 20. See Appendix H for recognition materials.

Procedures

First, the experimenter closely reviewed the informed consent form (Appendix I) with
each participant and responded to any questions and concerns. Second, participants completed a
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series of self-report questionnaires while sitting alone at a desk (PFEQ, LEC-5, PCL-5, and DQ).
Third, participants completed script assessment to generalized event knowledge for everyday
experiences and domain-specific event knowledge for the stressful experience (i.e., sexual
assault). Fourth, participants were oriented to the event segmentation task on a desktop computer
using the practice film. Fifth, depending on counterbalanced condition, participants viewed and
segmented either the non-stressful film or stressful film. Sixth, participants viewed the
remaining film (i.e., stressful film if non-stressful film viewed first or vice versa). Before and
after the stressful film, pre- and post-film self-report measures were administered (STAI-S6 and
PDEQ-7). After both films, the CAVEAT was administered. Seventh and eighth, participants
completed memory assessments for each film in the same order as viewed. Ninth, and lastly, the
experimenter conducted a positive mood induction procedure (Appendix J) and provided a
debriefing form (Appendix K) and a list of mental health counseling agencies (Appendix L).

Qualitative Data Coding

Everyday Event Script Assessment

Following Sargent et al. (2013), everyday event knowledge was assessed by totaling the
number of steps that correspond to one of the 18 norm-identified steps for that activity (Rosen,
Caplan, Sheesley, Rodriguez, & Grafman, 2003). The operationalized index of everyday event
knowledge ranges from 0 to 54 (i.e., 18 points for each of three everyday event scripts) with high
scores reflecting highly elaborated and accessible everyday event knowledge. Three
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undergraduate research assistants coded all everyday event scripts. Prior to coding, the principal
investigator trained the group of research assistants over three meetings. Training was
completed after the research assistants, as a group, produced codes for ten scripts that aligned
with over 90% of codes produced by the principal investigator. After training, research
assistants coded independently. The final codes were selected from the coding pair that
established the highest reliability across all three everyday event scripts, which was determined
by Cohen’s kappa. Codes from the third research assistant were used to resolve coding
discrepancies within the most reliable coding pair. Given that all 18 steps of each everyday
event was coded dichotomously as present (“1”) or absent (“0”), a group majority among three
coders emerged for all steps. In total, 116 participants completed the everyday event script task.
Given 18 steps to be coded per each of three everyday event scripts, each research assistant made
6,264 codes. The most reliable coding pair agreed on 95.7% of codes with a Cohen’s kappa of
.89. Reliability was comparable for the second coding pair (κ = .88; raw agreement = 95.4%)
and third coding pair (κ = .88; raw agreement = 95.3%). As anticipated, codes from the third
research assistant resolved all 273 disagreements within the most reliable coding pair. In the
final sample, everyday event script scores ranged from 3 to 22 with a mean of 12.45 (SD = 4.10)
and approximated a normal distribution.

Rape Script Assessment

Rape scripts were coded for resemblance to a typical rape script using a scoring key (see
Appendix D) that was constructed by the principal investigator for the purposes of this study
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based on a review of quantitative and qualitative findings on rape scripts (e.g., Davies et al,
2013; Krahé, Bieneck, & Scheinberger-Olwig, 2007; Littleton & Axsom, 2003; Littleton,
Breitkopf, & Berenson, 2007; Littleton, Tabernik, Canales, & Backstrom, 2009; Ryan, 1988).
The scoring key included 17 themes covering characteristics of the setting, perpetrator, and
victim. Each theme was coded for typical rape (score: +1), atypical rape (score: -1), and not
applicable or not included (score: 0). Thus, operationalization of “typical rape” event knowledge
was achieved by totaling the coded values of all themes, resulting in a potential range of -17 to
+17 with higher scores reflecting event knowledge that closely resembles a so-called typical rape
script. Importantly, all 17 typical rape themes were consistent with content of the stressful
stimulus (i.e., Irréversible; Chioua et al., 2002). Similar to the everyday event script coding, the
principal investigator trained the group of three research assistants over the course of three
meetings. After the group agreed with at least 90% of codes produced by the principal
investigator on ten scripts, research assistants independently coded the remainder of the dataset.
The final codes were selected from the most reliable coding pair as determined by Cohen’s
kappa. Coding discrepancies within the most reliable coding pair were resolved using codes
from the third research assistant. If no majority for a given theme of a given case emerged
between the three research assistants, a score of zero (i.e., “not applicable”) was coded. In total,
115 participants completed the rape script task. Given the 17 themes to be coded per rape script,
each research assistant made 1,955 codes. The most reliable coding pair agreed on 90.6% of
codes (κ = .757). Reliability was comparable for the second coding pair (κ = .749; raw
agreement = 91.2%) and third coding pair (κ = .730; raw agreement = 90.1%). Of the 183
disagreements within the most reliable coding pair, the third research assistant resolved 180
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discrepancies (98.4%). Thus, only three codes were overwritten with a zero (0.2% of data). In
the final sample, rape script scores ranged from -1 to 7 with a mean of 2.45 (SD = 1.91) and
approximated a normal distribution.

Non-Stressful Event Recall

Event memory of the non-stressful film (Big Night) was assessed to provide a baseline
index of event memory ability that may be used as a statistical control. Following Sargent et al.
(2013), to assess event recall, participants were asked to handwrite for seven minutes everything
that happened during the film in as much detail as possible and using the same sequential order
of actions (see Appendix G). Before coding recall data, each recall protocol was parsed into
“idea units.” An idea unit is defined as a clause that includes a stated (or inferable) subject and a
stated predicate in the form of a verb phase (e.g., a verb and an object). Any statement with two
or more subjects engaging in the same activity (e.g., “The two guests ate eggs”) was coded as
two or more idea units. In these instances, the idea unit was doubled within the dataset to
facilitate the coding of two different idea units (e.g., “The two guests eat eggs [Egg Eater #1]”
and “The two men ate eggs [Egg Eater #2]”). Two coders jointly parsed each protocol: the
principal investigator and one undergraduate research assistant. Parsing disagreements between
the coders were not systematically tracked but were estimated as infrequent (i.e., less than 10%
of data). The principal investigator resolved each parsing disagreement.
Event recall was operationalized as the total number of correctly recalled “accurate
explicit events,” with one point given to each unique event (i.e., multiple points were not given
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to multiple references to the same event). An accurate explicit event was defined as any goaldirected behavior committed by any agent within the film. The principal investigator coded Big
Night for 44 explicit events (23 committed by Stanley Tucci’s character [“Egg Cooker”], 15
committed by Marc Anthony’s character [“Egg Eater #1”], and six committed by Tony
Shalhoub’s character [“Egg Eater #2”]). See Appendix L for description of each explicit event.
If an idea unit was not coded as an accurate explicit event, it was coded as one of seven
dimensions that capture recall processes that are not relevant to the current study. These seven
dimensions will be briefly defined but not further analyzed. First, a “macro-statement” is a
general statement of two or more accurate explicit events (e.g., “The chef made breakfast”).
Second, an “inaccurate explicit events” is an event statement that is not depicted in the film (e.g.,
“He drank something”). Third, an “explicit characteristic” is a depicted trait or feature of the
setting or characters within the film (e.g., “It was a commercial kitchen”). Fourth, an “inference”
is an internal state of an agent, non-depicted causal link, or non-depicted characteristic of the
setting or characters (e.g., “The chef was hungry”). Fifth, an “affective response” is the
participant’s affective reaction to film (e.g., “This made me depressed”). Sixth, a “metacognition” is a reference to participant’s memory or behavior (e.g., “I was bored”). Seventh, an
“other” dimension is used to capture idea units that do not fit into any other dimension.
Each idea unit was coded for either one accurate explicit event or one of the seven
dimensions described above. When coded as an accurate explicit event, the coders specified
which of the 44 different explicit events the idea unit referenced. If a single idea unit appeared
to be applicable as an accurate explicit event and one of the seven dimensions (e.g., “I remember
the man cracking eggs” could be both a meta-cognition [“I remember …”] and an explicit event
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[“man cracking eggs”]), the idea unit would be coded for the accurate explicit event. For the
purposes of the current study, all seven of these dimensions were collapsed into one “null
category” that captures an amalgamation of recall processes that do not include retrieval of nonmacro, explicit events. Thus, each idea unit was coded for one of the 44 accurate explicit events
or the null category, totaling 45 potential codes for each idea unit.
Three research assistants were trained as a group by the principal investigator before they
began to code all parsed idea units with the 44 accurate explicit events and seven dimensions that
form the null category. After training, the research assistants were required to establish strong
inter-rater reliability using a subset of the data. Cohen’s kappa of .750 between all three coding
pairs was used as the threshold to confirm adequate reliability. For the reliability trial of the nonstressful event recall task, each research assistant was assigned 17 cases (15.6% of dataset) to
code. All three coding pairs exceeded the reliability threshold (pair #1: κ = .89, raw agreement =
89.5%; pair #2: κ = .88, raw agreement = 88.5%; pair #3; κ = .85, raw agreement = 85.5%).
Given that the 109 participants that completed the task averaged 26.06 idea units, each research
assistant was required to code 2,840 idea units. After establishing reliability, the research
assistants coded the remaining 92 cases (84.4% of dataset).
The final codes were selected from the most reliable coding pair on the entire dataset as
determined by Cohen’s kappa. Coding discrepancies within the most reliable coding pair were
resolved using codes from the third research assistant. If no majority for a given idea unit of a
given case emerged between the three research assistants, the principal investigator would pick
one of the three suggested codes. The most reliable coding pair agreed on 88.0% of codes (κ =
.874), which was comparable for the next most reliable coding pair (κ = .85; raw agreement =
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85.3%) and the least reliable coding pair (κ = .84; raw agreement = 84.5%). Of the 340
disagreements within the most reliable coding pair, the third research assistant resolved 283
discrepancies (83.2%). Thus, only 57 idea units had a three-way disagreement (2.0% of the
entire dataset). Of the 57 three-way agreements, the principal investigator chose one of the three
codes selected by the research assistants. The number of unique explicit events produced by
each participant was totaled. All but one participant in the final sample completed the task (N =
72). Non-stressful event recall ranged from 8 to 29 with a mean of 17.81 (SD = 4.70) and
approximated a normal distribution.

Stressful Event Recall

Similar to the non-stressful event memory assessment, event memory for the stressful
film was assessed with an event recall task. All procedures were identical: handwritten recall
responses within seven minutes, parsing protocols for idea units, creating scoring key based on
explicit events in film and other recall dimensions, training research assistants, completing the
reliability trial, tabulating final codes, and totaling number of accurate explicit events. The main
difference is that the scoring keys differed to accommodate differences in the content between
films. To construct the scoring key for Irréversible, the principal investigator coded 44 explicit
events (24 committed by Jo Prestia’s character [“Perpetrator”], 12 committed by Monica
Bellucci’s character [“Main Victim”], five committed by Jara Millo’s character [“Escaped
Victim”], and three committed by the Unaccredited Actor’s character [“Bystander”]). See
Appendix N for description of each explicit event. Again, research assistants coded each idea
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unit for either one of the 44 accurate explicit events or one of the seven dimensions that were
then collapsed into the null category.
Similar to the non-stressful event recall task, prior to coding the entire dataset, three
research assistants were trained over the course of three meetings and then were required to
establish reliability (threshold: Cohen’s kappa of .75 between all three coding pairs). For the
reliability trial, each research assistant was assigned 17 cases (15.5% of dataset) to code. All
three coding pairs exceeded the reliability threshold (pair #1: κ = .87, raw agreement = 88.2%;
pair #2: κ = .84, raw agreement = 85.8%; pair #3; κ = .81, raw agreement = 82.9%). Given that
the 110 participants who completed the task averaged 23.15 idea units, each research assistant
was required to code 2,547 idea units. After establishing reliability, the research assistants coded
the remaining 93 cases (84.5% of dataset). The final codes were selected from the most reliable
coding pair on the entire dataset as determined by Cohen’s kappa with discrepancies resolved
using the third research assistant’s codes. Given a lack of group majority, the principal
investigator would pick one of the three suggested codes. The most reliable coding pair agreed
on 89.0% of codes (κ = .88), which was comparable for the next most reliable coding pair (κ =
.86; raw agreement = 86.7%) and the least reliable coding pair (κ = .85; raw agreement =
86.1%). Of the 279 disagreements within the most reliable coding pair, the third research
assistant resolved 244 discrepancies (87.5%). Thus, only 35 idea units had a three-way
disagreement (1.4% of the entire dataset). Of the 35 three-way agreements, the principal
investigator, at his own discretion, chose one of the three codes selected by the research
assistants. The number of unique explicit events produced by each participant was totaled. In
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the final sample, stressful event recall ranged from 8 to 23 with a mean of 15.36 (SD = 3.51) and
approximated a normal distribution.

Segmentation Agreement Coding

Event Segmentation of Non-Stressful Event

During the non-stressful film, participants averaged 22.53 button presses (SD = 22.26)
with frequencies ranging from 2 to 162 in a non-normal distribution as skew was positive at 3.91
(null skewness 95% CI [-0.55, 0.55]) and kurtosis was positive at 21.55 (null kurtosis 95% CI [1.10, 1.10]). At the average rate of button presses, the mean duration of units was 13.68 seconds.
Although considerable variance existed in the number of button presses, which suggests slightly
different grain sizes across participants, the operationalization of segmentation performance
adjusted for individual differences in grain size (see below).
Segmentation performance was operationalized by agreement score, defined as the extent
to which one indicates the same event boundaries as an objective standard (e.g., Magliano et al.,
2005, 2012). The objective standard for each film was constructed following the precedent set
by Magliano and colleagues (Magliano et al., 2005, 2012). Specifically, Magliano and
colleagues identified the goal episodes of characters and when they temporally started and
stopped. Segmentation judgments were correlated with the boundaries of the goal episodes
(Magliano et al., 2005; 2012). In the present study, each 322-second film was parsed into 322
one-second bins and then coded (per bin) for the occurrence of a theoretically identified event
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boundary. Specifically, the primary investigator (AMS) and co-director (JPM) coded each film
event boundaries defined as the beginning and end of goal-directed behaviors committed by each
character. Expectedly, there was variability in temporality of the beginnings and ends of goal
sequences (range: one to four seconds). That is, some behaviors had a clear and quick onset
(e.g., perpetrator starting to enter hallway takes less than one second) and some behaviors had
ambiguous and slow onsets (e.g., perpetrator starting to pull victim toward ground takes about
four seconds). Additionally, all beginnings and ends of goal sequences were coded for one
additional bin in order to account for “lag effects” (i.e., some participants might exhibit a slight
delay between noticing an event boundary and then pressing the button). As a coding rule, all
beginnings and ends of goal sequences were coded for at least two bins (i.e., two seconds).
Thus, for example, although it takes less than one second for the perpetrator to enter the hallway,
this action was coded for two one-second bins. Bins with no boundaries were coded as “0” and
bins with one or more boundaries were coded with a whole integer indicating the number of
boundaries within the bin.
Segmentation agreement scores were computed following the precedent set by Kurby and
colleagues (Kurby et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013). Each participant’s
segmentation pattern was coded into the same one-second bin (“1” indicates at least event
boundary and “0” indicates no event boundary). Next, point-biserial correlational coefficients
were calculated between each participant’s segmentation pattern (i.e., binary data across 322
bins) and the objective standard (i.e., number of theoretically identified boundaries in each of
322 bins). The resulting coefficients (called “raw correlations”) are agreement scores; however,
further computations (called “scaled correlations”) can correct for between-subjects differences
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in inherently chosen grain sizes. To compute scaled correlations, each participant’s raw
correlation (rraw) was scaled based on the highest possible correlation (rmax) and the lowest
possible correlation (rmin) given the number of boundaries the participant identified. Specifically,
scaling was accomplished using this formula: (rraw – rmin)/(rmax – rmin). Thus, using the scaled
correlation approach, the agreement scores have a potential range of zero to one and remain
independent of the total event boundaries identified (i.e., the particular grain size strategy chosen
by the participant). In the final sample, the mean agreement score for Big Night was 0.40 (SD =
0.09) with a normal distribution ranging from 0.13 to 0.62.

Event Segmentation of Stressful Event

During the stressful film, participants averaged 36.25 spacebar presses (SD = 41.07) with
frequencies ranging from 1 to 275 in a non-normal distribution as skew was positive at 3.44 (null
skewness 95% CI [-0.55, 0.55]) and kurtosis was positive at 16.04 (null kurtosis 95% CI [-1.10,
1.10]). At the average rate of button presses, the mean duration of units was 8.86 seconds.
Following the same approach as Big Night, the principal investigator (AMS) and co-chair (JPM)
constructed an objective standard for Irréversible. Likewise, segmentation agreement scores
were calculated as described above. The mean agreement score for Irréversible was 0.38 (SD =
0.10) with scores ranging from 0.00 to 0.57 in a non-normal distribution as skew was negative at
-1.01 (null skewness 95% CI [-0.55, 0.55]) and kurtosis was positive at 1.90 (null kurtosis 95%
CI [-1.10, 1.10]).

CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

Preliminary Analyses

Data Screening

All variables were screened for missing data, out-of-range values, violations of normality,
and outliers. Frequency tables revealed no missing data or out-of-range values. As described in
Chapter 4 (Methods), the following variables did not approximate a normal distribution: prior
torture-porn exposure (PFEQ-TP), stressful film segmentation agreement, post-film state
dissociation (PDEQ-7), and percentage of time looking at the stressful film (CAVEAT). No raw
data transformations or outlier modifications were used for any of these variables because none
of these normality corrections meaningfully impacted the results of the planned analyses.

Objective Standard Coding Check

EST (Zacks et al., 2006) predicts that segmentation behavior will correlate positively
with a theoretically driven model of the event’s narrative structure (i.e., the “objective
standard”). This assumption has been received empirical support (Magliano, Taylor, & Kim,
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2005; Magliano, Kopp et al., 2012; Zacks et al., 2009). The primary investigator (AMS) and codirector (JPM) coded each film (Big Night and Irréversible) for the beginning and ending of
goal-directed behaviors committed by each character. For Big Night, participants averaged a raw
correlation of r = .09 between the objective standard and their segmentation behavior, which was
significantly greater than zero in a one-sample t-test, t(72) = 12.04, p < .001. For Irréversible,
participants averaged a raw correlation of r = .11 between the objective standard and their
segmentation behavior, which was significantly greater than zero in a one-sample t-test, t(72) =
12.54, p < .001. Thus, overall, participants’ segmentation behavior for each film appeared to
conform to the objective standard, which supports the basic assumptions of EST (Zacks et al.,
2006).1

Manipulation Check

To confirm that Irréversible functioned as a stressful stimulus, state anxiety (STAI-S6)
and state dissociation (PDEQ-7) were measured before (T1) and after (T2) participants watched
the clip. As anticipated, STAI-S6 T2 scores (M = 16.16, SD = 4.76) were significantly greater
than STAI-S6 T1 scores (M = 8.52, SD = 2.30) in a paired-samples t-test, t(72) = 14.09, p < .001.
Contrary to anticipation, PDEQ-7 T2 scores (M = 10.62, SD = 3.71) were not significantly
greater than PDEQ-7 T1 scores (M = 9.89, SD = 2.64), though a paired-samples t-test, t(72) =

1

In addition to using an objective standard to compute agreement scores, an alternative approach called “normative
agreement” compares each participant’s segmentation pattern to the entire sample’s aggregated segmentation pattern
(Kurby et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013). In the current project, normative agreement scores
were computed for all participants for both films. For exploratory purposes, all planned analyses were conducted
using the normative agreement scores. The results using normative agreement scores largely converged with results
using the objective standard agreement scores. As described in the method section, results will be presented using
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1.85, p = .069, showed a trend toward significance in the anticipated direction. Together, these
pre- and post-manipulation comparisons suggest the Irréversible clip had a robust effect on
increasing state anxiety and a marginal effect on increasing state dissociation.
Next, the number of unit boundaries identified by participants (i.e., button presses) during
the segmentation task was compared between films. Based on the difference in the number of
coded action units between the objective standard of each film (Irréversible = 93, Big Night =
52), it was anticipated that participants would detect more units in Irréversible than Big Night.
Consistent with expectations, the number of identified unit boundaries was significantly higher
for the stressful film (M = 36.25, SD = 41.07) than the non-stressful film (M = 22.73, SD =
22.17) using a paired-samples t-test, t(72) = 4.00, p < .001.
To demonstrate viewer response differences across films, paired samples t-tests were
conducted for each of the 13 CAVEAT items (see Table 2). To reduce the likelihood of a Type 1
Error resulting from 13 simultaneous comparisons, a Bonferroni correction was used to adjust
the conventional .05 p-value to .004 (.05/13). Participants reported that they did not pay greater
attention to either film, though a non-significant trend suggested more attention was paid to
Irréversible than Big Night. Participants reported greater empathy for the victim in Irréversible
than the omelet maker in Big Night, but not greater identification or perspective. All emotional
responses were significantly different and in expected directions (compared to Big Night,
Irréversible elicited greater anger, sadness, disgust and fear and less joy). Lastly, participants
looked at the screen for a greater percentage of time in Big Night than Irréversible but not a
greater number of instances of covering eyes, closing eyes, or looking away from the screen.
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Again, the estimated percentage of looking at the screen provides an index of “level of
attentiveness” to the stressful film that could potentially be used as a statistical control.
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Table 2
Differences in Viewer Response (CAVEAT) Across Films
Variable
I-1

I paid close attention to the film.

Group Statistics
Group
n
M

SD

t-test for Equality
of Means
t
df
p
-2.02 72 .047

Big Night

73

3.47

0.77

Irréversible

73

3.66

0.61

I-2

I shared the perspective of the victim (or, omeletmaker).

Big Night

73

1.88

1.31

Irréversible

73

2.21

1.50

I-3

I felt empathy for the victim (or, omelet-maker).

Big Night

73

1.47

1.26

Irréversible

73

3.62

0.83

Big Night

73

1.60

1.33

Irréversible

73

1.32

1.45

Big Night

73

0.19

0.54

Irréversible

73

2.77

1.34

Big Night

73

0.75

1.01

Irréversible

73

0.08

0.43

Big Night

73

1.08

1.39

Irréversible

73

2.74

1.23

I-4

I identified with the victim (or, omelet-maker).

II-1 I experienced anger.
II-2 I experienced joy.
II-3 I experienced sadness.
II-4 I experienced disgust.
II-5 I experienced fear.
III-1 Estimate the number of times you looked away
from the screen.
III-2 Estimate the number of times you closed your eyes
for an extended period of time.
III-3 Estimate the number of times you covered your
eyes with your clothes, hands, or other body parts.
III-4 Estimate the total percentage of time (range: 0% to
100%) that you were looking directly at the screen.

Big Night

73

0.26

0.67

Irréversible

73

3.59

0.76

Big Night

73

0.15

0.49

Irréversible

73

1.79

1.43

Big Night

73

0.38

0.89

Irréversible

73

0.84

1.72

Big Night

73

0.08

0.40

Irréversible

73

0.56

1.55

Big Night

73

0.01

0.12

Irréversible

73

0.18

0.67

Big Night

73 98.71 2.53

Irréversible

73 94.16 9.04

-1.50 72 .139
-12.43 72 < .001
1.53

72 .130

-14.96 72 < .001
5.18

72 < .001

-8.17 72 < .001
-28.42 72 < .001
-8.82 72 < .001
-1.91 72 .061
-2.92 72 .005
-2.18 72 .033
4.39

72 < .001
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Correlations

Next, correlation analyses were conducted to examine the relations between
segmentation agreement scores (both films), self-reported stress responses (state anxiety and
state dissociation), memory assessments (event recall and event recognition), and potential
control variables (time looking at screen, domain-specific and generic event knowledge, tortureporn exposure, and gender). See correlation matrix in Table 3.
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Table 3
Correlation Table
Category

Segmentation
Performance

SelfReported
Stress
Response
Event
Memory

Variable
1 Stressful
Segmentation
Agreement
2 Non-Stressful
Segmentation
Agreement
3 State Anxiety
(STAI-S6)
4
5
6
7

Potential
Statistical
Controls

8
9
10
11
12

State
Dissociation
(PDEQ-7)
Stressful Event
Recall
(Unique Units)
Stressful Event
Recognition
Non-Stressful
Event Recall
(Unique Units)
Time Looking
at Screen (SelfReport %)
Typical Rape
Script (Domain
Knowledge)
Everyday Event
Script (Generic
Knowledge)
Torture-Porn
Exposure
(PFEQ-TF)
Gender
(0 = Male; 1 =
Female)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

—

.26*

—

.22†

-.13

—

.25*

-.01

.54***

—

-.11

.09

.27*

.22†

—

-.28*

-.02

.00

-.19

.18

—

.08

.34**

-.01

.17

.47***

-.12

—

-.08

-.02

-.26*

.01

-.09

.08

-.02

—

.18

.09

.19

.26*

.27*

-.25*

-.03

.01

—

.15

-.01

.19

.06

.23*

.08

.19

-.08

.11

—

-.06

-.05

-.17

-.10

-.10

.14

.04

.26*

-.12

.03

—

-.05

.17

.21†

.16

.22†

-.14

.21†

-.26*

.13

.31**

-.16

Notes. † = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001.
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Significant correlations worth noting are briefly discussed. As can be seen in the first
column, a significant positive correlation was found between segmentation agreement scores of
the non-stressful film and the stressful film, which suggests factors outside of anxiety and
dissociation (e.g., underlying general abilities) contribute to the segmentation of the stressful
film. As expected, significant positive correlations were found between both self-report markers
of typical peritraumatic responses (i.e., state anxiety and state dissociation). Contrary to
expectations, stressful film segmentation agreement was positively correlated with state
dissociation and approached a significant positive correlation with state anxiety.
Other significant correlations worth noting are in regard to event memory. To begin,
non-stressful segmentation was positively correlated with non-stressful event recall, which is
consistent with prior research and thus provides empirical support for the project’s
administration and scoring of the event segmentation task and event recall task (Bailey et al.,
2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013). In comparison, stressful segmentation was
not directly related to stressful event recall. Further, stressful segmentation was negatively
correlated with stressful event recognition. Thus, the positive link between segmentation and
memory demonstrated in prior research may be altered in the context of stressful events. With
regard to stress responses, stressful event recall was positively correlated with state anxiety and
showed a trend toward a significant positive relationship with state dissociation, which suggests
a general, facilitative effect of stressful responding on memory. Lastly, stressful event recall was
positively correlated with potential control variables of non-stressful event recall and domainspecific event knowledge (i.e., typical rape script score). Thus, several factors appear to
positively influence stressful event recall including the anxiety and dissociation, event
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knowledge, and general recall abilities. In comparison, stressful event recognition was not
directly related to anxiety or dissociation and was negatively correlated with domain-specific
event knowledge, suggesting that event knowledge may differentially impact recall and
recognition.

Control Variables

Prior to conducting planned analyses, group differences were assessed between
counterbalanced conditions and participant gender. Independent samples t-tests comparing
randomly assigned counterbalanced conditions (Big Night first vs. Irréversible first) were
conducted on all the variables listed in the correlation matrix in Table 3. Bonferroni correction
was used to adjust the p-value to .004 (.05/12). No significant differences were found (all pvalues > .22), indicating that the order of films did not meaningfully impact any of the study’s
variables. Second, independent samples t-tests comparing genders were conducted on the same
variables. Bonferroni correction was used to adjust the p-value to .005 (.05/11). No significant
gender differences were found, though several tests approached statistical significance (see Table
4). Specifically, when compared to men, women exhibited trends toward higher everyday event
script scores, lower time looking at the screen during Irréversible (i.e., level of attentiveness),
greater state anxiety, greater stressful event recall, and greater non-stressful event recall.
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Table 4
Significant Gender Differences
Variable
Everyday Event Script (Generic Knowledge)
Time Looking at Screen (Self-Report %)*
Stressful Event Recall (Unique Units)
Non-Stressful Event Recall (Unique Units)
STAI-S6 (State Anxiety)

Group Statistics
Group
n
M

SD

Men

40

11.30

3.78

Women

33

13.85

4.09

Men

40

96.30

6.78

Women

33

91.58

10.74

Men

40

14.65

3.45

Women

33

16.21

3.44

Men

39

16.90

4.73

Women

33

18.88

4.49

Men

40

15.28

4.64

Women

33

17.24

4.74

t-test for Equality of Means
t
df
p
-2.76

71

.007

2.27

71

.025

-1.93

71

.058

-1.81

70

.074

-1.79

71

.078

Notes. Before conducting each independent samples t-test, a Levene’s test was conducted to test
at the 0.05 level the null hypothesis that that the variances of the two populations from which the
samples were drawn are equal. The null was rejected only for time looking at the screen, F(1,
71) = 4.72, p = .033, which was likely due to ceiling effects among male participants.

The correlation analyses and tests for group differences (gender and counterbalance
conditions) informed which variables would be the most useful statistical controls in the planned
analyses. Depending on the analysis, up to four variables were used as control variables. First,
given the gender differences noted above, gender was statistically controlled. Second, given the
moderate correlation between non-stressful event segmentation and stressful event segmentation,
non-stressful event segmentation was used to statistically control for segmentation ability during
non-stressful experiences (see Sargent et al., 2013). Rather than using several clips depicting
everyday activities to establish a control for segmentation ability (see Sargent et al., 2013), Big
Night could be used for this purpose due to the highly objective manner in which it was shot (i.e.,
the scene resembled an everyday activity). Third, given the moderate correlation between non-
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stressful event recall and stressful event recall, non-stressful event recall was used to statistically
control for recall ability of non-stressful experiences. While recall ability can be assessed by
collecting recall protocols for several clips of everyday experiences, which would provide a
stable measure of skill, recall of the objectively shot Big Night scene may approximate a more
generalized recall ability. Fourth, given the moderate correlations between domain-specific
event knowledge (i.e., typical rape script score) and both stressful event memory variables (recall
and recognition), domain-specific event knowledge was used as a statistical control.

Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis 1

The first hypothesis was that encoding disruption occurs during stressful experiences.
Following this hypothesis, it was predicted that stressful film agreement scores would be lower
than non-stressful film agreement scores. Hypothesis 1 was tested using a paired-samples t-test.
In direct contrast to predictions, raw segmentation agreement scores were significantly higher for
the stressful film (M = .112, SD = .076) than the non-stressful film (M = .086, SD = .061), t(72) =
2.20, p = .031, Cohen’s d = 0.26.2

2

To rule-out the possibility that the number of units identified for each film artificially increased agreement scores,
a similar analysis was conducted that controls for number of units in each film. Specifically, a repeated measures
linear regression was used with segmentation agreement of each film as the within-subjects variable and number of
units for each film as covariates. Results indicate a significant difference between films in agreement scores, F(1,
70) = 14.62, p < .001. Thus, the number of units identified did not appear to artificially enhance segmentation
scores.
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Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 assumes that anxiety and dissociation predict peritraumatic encoding
disruption. Following this hypothesis, it was predicted that agreement scores for the stressful
film would be negatively related to state anxiety and state dissociation. As planned, two separate
multiple regression analyses using forced entry were conducted to predict agreement score, each
with a different IV representing either state anxiety (STAI-S6) or state dissociation (PDEQ-7).
Additionally, domain-specific event knowledge, non-stressful film agreement score, and gender
were included as control variables in both regression analyses (Table 5).

Table 5
Hypothesis 2 Multiple Regression Models Predicting Agreement Segmentation in Stressful Film
b
SE
Anxiety à Segmentation
—
—
Constant 0.19 0.07
Gender -0.03 0.02
Non-Stressful Segmentation 0.33 0.12
Typical Rape Knowledge 0.01 0.01
State Anxiety 0.01 0.00
Dissociation à Segmentation
—
—
Constant 0.22 0.06
Gender -0.03 0.02
Non-Stressful Segmentation 0.29 0.12
Typical Rape Knowledge 0.01 0.01
State Dissociation 0.01 0.00

Variables
β
t
—
—
2.87
-.174 -1.51
.313 2.74
.126 1.11
.274 2.35
—
-.150
.278
.111
.252

—
3.61
-1.31
2.46
0.96
2.17

p
—
.006
.137
.008
.270
.022

Model
R
F
.173 3.55
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

p
.011
—
—
—
—
—

—
.001
.194
.016
.341
.034

.163 3.31
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

.015
—
—
—
—
—

2
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First, the multiple regression model including state anxiety was significant, R2 = .173,
F(4, 68) = 3.55, p = .011. However, in the opposite direction to expectations, state anxiety
significantly and positively predicted the objective segmentation agreement scores, β = .274,
t(68) = 2.35, p = .022. Non-stressful event segmentation was the only control variable that
significantly predicted stressful event segmentation, β = .313, t(68) = 2.74, p = .008.
Second, the multiple regression model including state dissociation was significant, R2 =
.163, F(4, 68) = 3.31, p = .015. However, again in the opposite direction to expectations, state
dissociation significantly and positively predicted objective segmentation agreement scores, β =
.252, t(68) = 2.17, p = .034. Non-stressful event segmentation was the only control variable that
significantly predicted stressful event segmentation, β = .278, t(68) = 2.46, p = .016.

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 assumes that peritraumatic encoding disruption predicts event memory
disturbance. Following this hypothesis, it was predicted that agreement scores would positively
predict event recall and recognition for the stressful film. As planned, two separate multiple
regression analyses using forced entry was conducted using agreement score as the IV and either
recall score or recognition scores as the DV. Control variables included gender, domain-specific
event knowledge, and non-stressful event agreement score. The recall model also included nonstressful event recall as a control. Table 6 shows the results of the regression analyses.
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Table 6
Hypothesis 3 Multiple Regression Models Predicting Recall and Recognition of Stressful Film

Segmentation à Recall
Constant
Gender
Segmentation (Non-Stress)
Typical Rape Knowledge
Non-Stressful Recall
Segmentation (Stress)

b
—
10.01
0.47
-2.86
0.55
0.37
-5.31

Segmentation à Recognition —
Constant 18.46
Gender -0.35
Segmentation (Non-Stress) 1.27
Typical Rape Knowledge -0.13
Segmentation (Stress) -3.54

Variables
SE
β
t
—
—
—
2.14
—
4.69
0.72 .068 0.65
4.11 -.078 -0.70
0.19 .308 2.97
0.08 .499 4.58
3.75 -.150 -1.41

p
—
< .001
.517
.489
.004
< .001
.162

R
.333
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model
F
p
6.59 < .001
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
0.84
0.30
1.63
0.08
1.55

—
< .001
.238
.440
.101
.025

.140
—
—
—
—
—

2.77
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
-.138
.092
-.192
-.272

—
22.08
-1.19
0.78
-1.66
-2.29

2

.034
—
—
—
—
—

First, the multiple regression model investigating stressful event recall was significant, R2
= .333, F(5, 66) = 6.59, p < .001. However, despite expectations, segmentation agreement scores
were not related to stressful event recall, β = -.150, t(66) = -1.41, p = .162. Rather, stressful
event recall was significantly and positively predicted by domain-specific event knowledge, β =
.308, t(66) = 2.97, p = .004, and non-stressful event recall, β = .499, t(66) = 4.58, p < .001.
Second, the multiple regression model investigating stressful event recognition was
significant, R2 = .140, F(4, 68) = 2.77, p = .034. However, in the opposite direction of
predictions, segmentation agreement scores significantly and negatively predicted stressful event
recognition, β = -.272, t(68) = -2.29, p = .025. No control variables were significant.
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Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 assumes that encoding disruption is a mediating mechanism by which
anxiety and dissociation cause event memory disturbance (i.e., the full version of the “PED
Hypothesis”). Following this hypothesis, it was predicted that affective and dissociative
responses would negatively predict recall and recognition indirectly through unsystematic event
segmentation. As planned, four separate mediational analyses were conducted, each with either
state anxiety (STAI-S6) or state dissociation (PDEQ-7) as the independent variable, all with
agreement score in the stressful film as the mediator, and each with either recall score or
recognition score as the dependent variable. The controls were gender, agreement score in the
non-stressful film, and domain-specific event knowledge. The recall models also included event
recall of the non-stressful film as a control. In each of the four mediation analyses, the indirect
effect was tested using confidence intervals (CIs) derived from bias-corrected bootstrapping
(Hayes, 2013; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). This procedure, executed using the PROCESS macro of
SPSS (Hayes, 2013), treats the sample as a “miniature representation” of the population by
repeatedly resampling (with replacement) the original dataset (recommended iterations: 10,000;
Mallinckrodt, Abraham, Wei, & Russell, 2006). A significant indirect effect is evidenced by a
95% CI that does not span zero, which suggests the indirect effect is significantly different than
zero. According to Hayes (2013), the best method to illustrate the size of the indirect effect
using the current analyses is a completely standardized effect (abcs), which is interpreted as the
number of SD changes in Y (i.e., state anxiety of state dissociation) due to one SD increase in X
(i.e., recall or recognition) as it operates through M (i.e., stressful film segmentation score).
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Additionally, Hayes (2013) suggests reporting the ratio of the size of the indirect effect
compared to the direct effect. See Figure 2 for the statistical model being used.
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a

b
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Figure 2. A measurement model for mediation analyses that tested predictions based on
Hypothesis 4. Statistically, two linear models were tested. First, the mediator (M) is equal to i1
+ aX + f1C1 + f2C2 + f3C3 + f4C4 + eM, where i1 is the regression intercept, eM is the error in the
estimation of M, a is the regression coefficients of the predictor (X), and fi is the regression
coefficient of each control variable (Ci). Second, the dependent variable (Y) is equal to i2 + c’X +
bM + + g1C1 + g2C2 + g3C3 + g4C4 + eY, where i2 is the regression intercept, eY is the error in the
estimation of Y, c’ is the regression coefficients of the predictor (X), and b is the regression
coefficient for M.
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First, the indirect effect of state anxiety on stressful event recall through stressful
segmentation was statistically significant, though in the opposite direction as predicted (Table 7).
Specifically, the mediational analysis found that state anxiety was positivity related to stressful
segmentation (a = 0.01, p = .023), which negatively predicted stressful recall (b = -7.61, p =
.037). The indirect link was significant, ab = -0.04, 95% bias-corrected CI [-0.12, -0.01] (abcs =
-0.07; 95% bias-corrected CI [-0.19, -0.01]). Further, the direct link between state anxiety and
stressful recall was significant (c’ = 0.20, p = .011). The indirect effect was only 22% the size of
the significant direct positive effect of state anxiety on recall. Thus, state anxiety appears to
have a positive direct effect on recall, which is consistent with basic memory research (e.g.,
Henckens, Hermans, Pu, Joëls, & Fernández, 2009; Porter & Peace, 2007). In addition to the
positive direct effect, state anxiety appears to have a negative indirect effect on recall through
segmentation, which is opposite to expectations based on Hypothesis 4. These findings suggest
that state anxiety might have an overall facilitative effect on recall, yet recall diminishes to the
extent that state anxiety increases segmentation systematicity. It is theoretically reasonable that
within one statistical model a negative conduit can exist within the total positive effect of a
predictor (Hayes, 2013). Memory systems beyond cognitive encoding mechanisms, and
specifically event segmentation, can account for the positive relationship between recall and
anxiety or dissociation. Memory systems that are enhanced by stressful responding include
evaluated cortisol levels (Buchanan & Lovallo, 2001; Schwabe et al., 2012), noradrenergic
activation (Schwabe et al., 2009; Wiemers, Sauvage, Schoofs, Hamacher-Dang, & Wolf, 2013),
and activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus and middle temporal gyrus (Bourne, Mackay, &
Holmes, 2013; Clark, Holmes, Woolrich, & Mackay, 2016).
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Table 7
Indirect Effect of State Anxiety on Stressful Recall through Stressful Segmentation

Mediator: Stressful Segmentation
Constant
Gender (C1)
Typical Rape Knowledge (C2)
Non-Stressful Segmentation (C3)
Non-Stressful Recall (C4)
State Anxiety (X)
Outcome: Stressful Recall
Constant
Gender (C1)
Typical Rape Knowledge (C2)
Non-Stressful Segmentation (C3)
Non-Stressful Recall (C4)
State Anxiety (X)
Stressful Segmentation (M)

coeff.
—
0.18
-0.03
0.01
0.33
0.00
0.01

Variables
SE
t
—
—
0.07 2.61
0.02 -1.36
0.01 1.13
0.13 2.55
0.00 0.07
0.00 2.28

—
7.61
0.00
0.49
-0.25
0.36
0.20
-7.61

—
2.24
0.71
0.18
4.06
0.08
0.08
3.72

Direct Effect (c’)
State Anxiety (X)
à Stressful Event Recall (Y)
Indirect Effect (ab)
State Anxiety (X)
à Stressful Event Segmentation (M)
à Stressful Event Recall (Y)

—
3.40
0.01
2.72
-0.06
4.75
2.63
-2.13

p
—
.011
.180
.262
.013
.944
.023

R
.172
—
—
—
—
—
—

Path
F
2.75
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
.001
.995
.009
.952
< .001
.011
.037

.397
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

7.14
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

2

p
.026
—
—
—
—
—
—
< .001
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Direct and Indirect Effects
coeff. SE
t
p
—
—
—
—

95% CI
Lower
Upper
—
—

0.20

0.08

2.63

.011

0.048

0.352

—

—

—

—

—

—

-0.04

0.03

—

—

-0.121

-0.005

Notes. Significant p-values and CIs are in bolded. See Figure 2 for an illustration of the
statistical model.
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Second, the indirect effect of state dissociation on stressful recall through stressful
segmentation was not statistically significant (see Table 8). Specifically, the mediational
analysis found that state dissociation was positivity related to stressful segmentation (a = 0.01, p
= .037), which was not significantly related to stressful recall (b = -6.24, p = .113). When using
a 95% CI, the indirect link was not significant, ab = -0.04, 95% bias-corrected CI [-0.13, 0.00],
(abcs = -0.05; 95% bias-corrected CI [-0.16, 0.00]). However, the mediation effect was trending
toward significance in the opposite direction of predictions when using a 90% bias-corrected CI
(-0.11, -0.00). Lastly, the direct link between state anxiety and stressful recall was not
significant (c’ = 0.10, p = .348). The indirect effect was only 43% the size of the non-significant
direct positive effect of state dissociation on recall. These null findings do not support
predictions.
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Table 8
Indirect Effect of State Dissociation on Stressful Recall through Stressful Segmentation

Mediator: Stressful Segmentation
Constant
Gender (C1)
Typical Rape Knowledge (C2)
Non-Stressful Segmentation (C3)
Non-Stressful Recall (C4)
State Dissociation (X)
Outcome: Stressful Recall
Constant
Gender (C1)
Typical Rape Knowledge (C2)
Non-Stressful Segmentation (C3)
Non-Stressful Recall (C4)
State Dissociation (X)
Stressful Segmentation (M)

coeff.
—
0.22
-0.03
0.01
0.31
0.00
0.01

Variables
SE
t
—
—
0.06 3.44
0.02 -1.12
0.01 0.93
0.13 2.40
0.00 -0.29
0.00 2.12

—
9.55
0.37
0.51
-2.14
0.35
0.10
-6.24

—
2.19
0.73
0.19
4.18
0.08
0.10
3.88

Direct Effect (c’)
State Dissociation (X)
à Stressful Event Recall (Y)
Indirect Effect (ab)
State Dissociation (X)
à Stressful Event Segmentation (M)
à Stressful Event Recall (Y)

—
4.35
0.51
2.67
-0.51
4.32
0.95
-1.61

p
—
.001
.268
.353
.019
.770
.037

R
.165
—
—
—
—
—
—

Path
F
2.60
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
< .001
.612
.010
.611
< .001
.348
.113

.342
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

5.64
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

2

p
.033
—
—
—
—
—
—
< .001
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Direct and Indirect Effects
coeff. SE
t
p
—
—
—
—

95% CI
Lower
Upper
—
—

0.10

0.10

0.95

.348

-0.108

0.302

—

—

—

—

—

—

-0.04

0.03

—

—

-0.132

0.004

Notes. When using a bias-corrected 90% CI, the indirect effect is significant (lower CI = -0.113,
upper CI = -0.003). Significant p-values and CIs are in bolded. Marginal p-values and CIs are in
italicized. See Figure 2 for an illustration of the statistical model.
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Third, the indirect effect of state anxiety on stressful event recognition through stressful
event segmentation was statistically significant, though in the opposite direction as predicted
(Table 9). Specifically, the mediational analysis found that state anxiety was positivity related to
stressful event segmentation (a = 0.01, p = .022), which negatively predicted stressful event
recognition (b = -4.11, p = .013). The indirect link was significant, ab = -0.02, 95% biascorrected CI [-0.06, -0.01], (abcs = -0.09; 95% bias-corrected CI [-0.20, -0.02]). Further, the
direct link between state anxiety and stressful recognition was not significant (c’ = 0.04, p =
.198). The indirect effect was only 54% the size of the non-significant direct positive effect of
state anxiety on recognition. Thus, findings suggest a mediating effect of segmentation on the
negative impact of state anxiety on recognition, which is opposite to predictions based on
Hypothesis 4.
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Table 9
Indirect Effect of State Anxiety on Stressful Recognition through Stressful Segmentation

Mediator: Stressful Segmentation
Constant
Gender (C1)
Typical Rape Knowledge (C2)
Non-Stressful Segmentation (C3)
State Anxiety (X)

coeff.
—
0.19
-0.03
0.01
0.33
0.01

Outcome: Stressful Recognition
—
Constant 17.94
Gender (C1) -0.45
Typical Rape Knowledge (C2) -0.14
Non-Stressful Segmentation (C3) 1.82
State Anxiety (X) 0.04
Stressful Segmentation (M) -4.11

Direct Effect (c’)

Variables
SE
t
—
—
0.07 2.86
0.02 -1.51
0.01 1.11
0.12 2.74
0.00 2.35
—
0.92
0.30
0.08
1.68
0.03
1.60

—
19.44
-1.49
-1.83
1.08
1.30
-2.56

p
—
.006
.137
.271
.008
.022

R
.173
—
—
—
—
—

Path
F
3.55
—
—
—
—
—

—
< .001
.142
.072
.282
.198
.013

.161
—
—
—
—
—
—

2.58
—
—
—
—
—
—

Direct and Indirect Effects
coeff
SE
t
p
—
—
—
—

State Anxiety (X)
0.04
à Stressful Event Recognition (Y)
Indirect Effect (ab)
—
State Anxiety (X)
à Stressful Event Segmentation (M) -0.02
à Stressful Event Recognition (Y)

2

p
.011
—
—
—
—
—
.034
—
—
—
—
—
—

95% CI
Lower
Upper
—
—

0.03

1.30

.198

-0.023

0.109

—

—

—

—

—

0.01

—

—

-0.055

-0.005

Notes. Significant p-values and CIs are in bolded. Marginal p-values and CIs are in italicized.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of the statistical model.
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Fourth, the indirect effect of state dissociation on stressful event recognition through
stressful event segmentation was statistically significant, though in the opposite direction as
predicted (Table 10). Specifically, the mediational analysis found that state dissociation was
positivity related to stressful event segmentation (a = 0.01, p = .034), which was negatively
related to stressful event recognition (b = -3.37, p = .041). The indirect link was significant, ab =
-0.02, 95% bias-corrected CI [-0.06, -0.00] (abcs = -0.06; 95% bias-corrected CI [-0.16, -0.01]).
Further, the direct link between state dissociation and stressful recognition was not significant (c’
= -0.02, p = .672). The indirect effect was 25% larger than the size of the non-significant direct
negative effect of state dissociation on recognition. Thus, findings suggest a mediating effect of
segmentation on the negative impact of state dissociation on event recognition, which is opposite
to predictions based on Hypothesis 4.
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Table 10
Indirect Effect of State Dissociation on Stressful Recognition through Stressful Segmentation

Mediator: Stressful Segmentation
Constant
Gender (C1)
Typical Rape Knowledge (C2)
Non-Stressful Segmentation (C3)
State Dissociation (X)

coeff.
—
0.22
-0.03
0.01
0.29
0.01

Outcome: Stressful Recognition
—
Constant 18.57
Gender (C1) -0.33
Typical Rape Knowledge (C2) -0.12
Non-Stressful Segmentation (C3) 1.17
State Dissociation (X) -0.02
Stressful Segmentation (M) -3.37

Direct Effect (c’)
State Dissociation (X)
à Stressful Event Recognition (Y)
Indirect Effect (ab)
State Dissociation (X)
à Stressful Event Segmentation (M)
à Stressful Event Recognition (Y)

Variables
SE
t
—
—
0.06 3.61
0.02 -1.31
0.01 0.96
0.12 2.46
0.00 2.17

p
—
< .001
.194
.341
.016
.034

—
0.88
0.30
0.08
1.65
0.04
1.61

—
< .001
.279
.131
.480
.672
.041

—
21.09
-1.09
-1.53
0.71
-0.43
-2.09

R
.163
—
—
—
—
—

Path
F
3.31
—
—
—
—
—

p
.015
—
—
—
—
—

.143
—
—
—
—
—
—

2.23
—
—
—
—
—
—

.062
—
—
—
—
—
—

2

Direct and Indirect Effects
coeff. SE
t
p
—
—
—
—

95% CI
Lower
Upper
—
—

-0.02

0.04

-0.43

.672

-0.102

0.066

—

—

—

—

—

—

-0.02

0.01

—

—

-0.058

-0.003

Notes. Significant p-values and CIs are in bolded. Marginal p-values and CIs are in italicized.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of the statistical model.

CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION

The goal of this dissertation was to execute an analog laboratory design using a momentto-moment measure of one encoding process to test the peritraumatic encoding disruption (PED)
hypothesis. This dissertation addressed a significant gap in the literature, specifically,
understanding the extent to which one encoding process, as measured moment-to-moment, is
impacted by stressful experiences. Cognitive theories of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers &
Clark, 2000) argue that increases in affect and dissociation during a stressful experience will
disrupt standard encoding processes, namely with an attentional bias toward perceptual
information and away from conceptual information. Further, these theories assume that stressinduced encoding disruption forms event memory representations that are neither cohesive nor
elaborated effectively within one’s autobiography. According to PTSD theories, the content of
trauma memory representations remain disjointed and difficult to retrieve voluntarily while, at
the same time, the memory content is easily triggered by environmental cues. The PED
hypothesis has received empirical support from retrospective self-report studies and trauma
analog studies that use cognitive distractor tasks to simulate the phenomenon of encoding
disruption. To add to the literature by providing a test of the PED hypothesis using a moment-tomoment measure of one encoding process during a stressful experience, this dissertation
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introduced a new paradigm in which the event segmentation task is inserted into the stressful
film paradigm (SFP).
Given that multiple assumptions are embedded within the PED hypothesis, this
dissertation deconstructed the PED hypothesis into four smaller hypotheses. First, the PED
hypothesis assumes the encoding of stressful experiences becomes atypical when compared
against the encoding of everyday, non-stressful experiences (Hypothesis 1). Second, the PED
hypothesis assumes that affective and dissociative responses within stressful experiences result
in this reduced systematicity of encoding processes (Hypothesis 2). Third, the PED hypothesis
assumes that reduced systematicity of encoding processes results in poor voluntary memory
(Hypothesis 3). Fourth, the PED hypothesis assumes that reduced systematicity of encoding
processes is a conduit (i.e., mediator) through which affective and dissociative responses have a
negative effect on voluntary memory.

Summary of Results

None of the predictions based on the four hypotheses were supported (see Table 11).
However, data analyses revealed many significant effects. Each significant effect was in the
opposite direction of predictions. The most important findings will be highlighted in this section
and interpretations will be discussed in the next section.
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Table 11
Summary of Hypotheses, Predictions, and Results
Hypotheses
H1

H2

H3

H4

Statements
• Segmentation agreement
scores will be lower for the
stressful film than the nonstressful film
1. Segmentation agreement
scores for the stressful film
will be negatively related to
state anxiety.
2. Segmentation agreement
scores for the stressful film
will be negatively related to
state dissociation.
1. Segmentation agreement
scores during the stressful film
will positively predict recall.
2. Segmentation agreement
scores for the stressful film
will positively predict
recognition.
1. Segmentation agreement
scores during the stressful film
will mediate the negative
relationship between state
anxiety and recall.
2. Segmentation agreement
scores during the stressful film
will mediate the negative
relationship between state
dissociation and recall.
3. Segmentation agreement
scores during the stressful film
will mediate the negative
relationship between state
anxiety and recognition.
4. Segmentation agreement
scores during the stressful film
will mediate the negative
relationship between state
dissociation and recognition.

Predictions
IV

Results
Direction

Mediator

DV

Sig.

Stressful film
vs. nonstressful film

N/A

Agreement
scores

Yes

Opposite of
prediction

Agreement
score for
stressful film

N/A

Post-film
state anxiety

Yes

Opposite of
prediction

Agreement
score for
stressful film

N/A

Post-film
state
dissociation

Yes

Opposite of
prediction

Agreement
score for
stressful film

N/A

No

N/A

Agreement
score for
stressful film

N/A

Yes

Opposite of
prediction

Post-film
state anxiety

Agreement
score for
stressful
film

Recall score
for stressful
film

Yes

Opposite of
prediction

Post-film
state
dissociation

Agreement
score for
stressful
film

Recall score
for stressful
film

No

N/A
(Trending
in opposite
direction of
predictions)

Post-film
state anxiety

Agreement
score for
stressful
film

Recognition
score for
stressful
film

Yes

Opposite of
prediction

Post-film
state
dissociation

Agreement
score for
stressful
film

Recognition
score for
stressful
film

Yes

Opposite of
prediction

Recall score
for stressful
film
Recognition
score for
stressful
film
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First, the stressful film resulted in higher segmentation agreement scores than the nonstressful film, which was in the opposite direction of the effect predicted in Hypothesis 1. Given
that the remaining hypotheses assumed stressful experiences would diminish segmentation
agreement, it was then not surprising to discover that the remaining analyses produced results
that trended (often significantly) in the opposite direction of predictions.
Second, anxiety and dissociation during the stressful experience appeared to increase
segmentation agreement, not decease segmentation as predicted in Hypothesis 2. This positive
link between the stress responses (anxiety and dissociation) and segmentation performance is
consistent with the finding that segmentation agreement scores were significantly higher in the
stressful film when compared to the non-stressful film. It is possible that anxiety and
dissociation enhanced segmentation agreement.
Third, there were mixed findings for predictions based on Hypothesis 3, which assumed
that low segmentation agreement scores during the stressful experience would result in low
memory performance. Opposite to this prediction, there was a negative effect of segmentation
agreement on recognition. This finding is particularly notable because no previous study using
non-stressful materials has shown that high segmentation agreement predicts low memory
performance (Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013). Alongside the
significant negative effect of segmentation on recognition, there was no effect of segmentation
agreement on recall of the stressful film. And, while segmentation did not appear to affect recall
of the stressful film, there was a positive relationship between segmentation and recall of the
non-stressful film. The positive link between segmentation and memory for the non-stressful
film is consistent with other studies (Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al.,
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2013). The unexpected finding that, during stressful experiences, segmentation does not impact
recall and has a negative impact on recognition may indicate that the relationship between
segmentation and memory systems may be different for stressful experiences than non-stressful
experiences. Interpretations of this pattern of results are discussed in the next section.
Fourth, in a consistent pattern of significant and marginal effects, results indicate that
affective and dissociative responses to the stressful film had an indirect and negative effect on
voluntary memory through high segmentation agreement, not low segmentation agreement as
predicted based on Hypothesis 4. While this evidence is consistent with the assumption that
event segmentation is a conduit through which the stress responses negatively impact memory
(Hypothesis 4), it was predicted that the indirect effect would be mediated by low segmentation
agreement, not high segmentation agreement. Thus, it appears that anxiety and dissociation
enhanced segmentation, yet this enhancement does not translate to stronger memory
performance.
In sum, although none of the hypotheses were supported, results indicated a pattern of
significant results that were consistently in the opposite direction as predicted. Although the
hypotheses were not supported, the significant results warrant cautious interpretation. All posthoc interpretations are exploratory in nature and will benefit from replication.
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Interpretations of Findings

General Support for Event Segmentation Theory (EST)

This dissertation is not a test of EST; however, the results are largely consistent with
EST. First, for both films, there was a significant correlation between participants’ segmentation
behavior and the objective standard (i.e., the goal structure of each film’s narrative). The
correspondence between theoretically defined event boundaries and participant-identified event
boundaries is consistent with other studies (Magliano et al., 2005; Magliano, Kopp et al., 2012;
Zacks et al., 2009) and provides credence to EST’s assumption that perceived event boundaries
can be predicted based on a theoretically driven codification of character actions. Second, for
the stressful film, conceptual knowledge (typical rape scripts) was not significantly related to
segmentation but was significantly related to event memory (recall and recognition). Consistent
with these findings, EST predicts the top-down influence of conceptual knowledge does not
directly influence segmentation but may contribute to the updating of event models, which are
then encoded into memory. Third, for the non-stressful film, the finding that segmentation
agreement and recall were significantly positively correlated is consistent with EST’s assumption
that segmentation performance facilitates memory (Zacks et al., 2006), which has been
demonstrated by other studies using non-stressful stimuli (Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks,
2011; Sargent et al., 2013). Thus, at least for the non-stressful film, the basic assumptions of
EST were supported. Further, given that the positive effect of segmentation on non-stressful film
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recall was replicated successfully, these results indicate accuracy and fidelity in the
administration and scoring of (a) the event segmentation task and (b) the recall task.

Greater Segmentation Agreement in Stressful Film than Non-Stressful Film

All significant effects that emerged in the opposite direction of predictions are rooted in
the same unexpected phenomenon: anxiety and dissociation appeared to enhance the
systematicity with which segmentation processes operate. Three possibilities will be introduced
to explain why segmentation agreement was higher in the stressful film than the non-stressful
film. The first two possibilities argue that this finding is not due to anxiety and dissociation per
se but differences in the films used in the current study. The third possibility argues that anxiety
and dissociation may indeed facilitate segmentation processes.
Possibility #1: Confound of film devices. The differences in segmentation agreement
between the stressful film and non-stressful film may be the result of differences in the way the
films were shot. Commercially produced films, including Irréversible and Big Night, are
typically shot using techniques to capture attentional processes and direct them to certain
narrative events (Smith, 2012; Loschky et al., 2015). These techniques are used selectively to
narrow or broaden attentional focus, as well as maintain or disrupt gaze duration. Although an
effort was made in the current project to closely match pre-existing film clips on cinematic
techniques, the stressful film may have a meaningfully greater number of these features than the
non-stressful film. The stressful film (Irréversible) used several nuanced techniques that
changed across the duration of the scene such as alterations to lighting, camera movement, actor
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choreography, and sound editing. In comparison, the non-stressful film (Big Night) used a more
static camera and the choreography was less of a salient force to direct attention – as a result, the
viewer’s eye in Big Night may have been more free to wander across the scene. If Irréversible
was more successful in modulating the viewer’s attention than Big Night, then more consistent
agreement with the objective standard would be expected. This possibility highlights the need
for future studies to control for material content. Materials are needed that simulate real life
events and contain few constraints on attention. It should be noted, however, that while film
devices can potentially explain differences in segmentation agreement across films, film devices
cannot readily explain why segmentation of the stressful film was positively related to anxiety
and dissociation and negatively related to memory performance.
Possibility #2: Confound of action units. Another confound is a different number of
actions units between films. Although both films were the same length (322 seconds) and had
approximately 44 distinct agent goals (see Appendices L and M), the agent goals in Irréversible
were repeated many times (e.g., multiple attempts of perpetrator to remove victim’s clothes).
Irréversible depicted a hectic narrative structure (albeit “stereotypical” when compared to other
assault scenarios), whereas the narrative structure of Big Night followed the benign and familiar
procedure of making breakfast. Thus, there were more action units in the stressful film (93) than
the non-stressful film (52). With a greater number of action units comes the opportunity for a
greater number of segmentation behaviors. Indeed, the results indicated that participants
indicated significantly more event boundaries in Irréversible than Big Night. From a purely
statistical perspective, with a greater number of action units and segmentation behaviors comes a
greater chance for more stable correlations between the two variables. Similar to the first
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possibility, this possibility calls for future research to control for material content. And again, it
should be noted that although differences in total action units can potentially account for
variability in segmentation across films, the number of action units cannot readily explain why
segmentation of the stressful film was positively related to anxiety and dissociation and
negatively related to memory performance.
Possibility #3: Stress enhances detection of perceptual changes. Until this dissertation,
no prior study had investigated the role of anxiety or dissociation in the segmentation system. It
was originally assumed that the primary impact of anxiety and dissociation would be to diminish
top-down conceptual processing, thus reducing segmentation systematicity because event
knowledge would have a diminished influence during the updating of event models (Zacks et al.,
2006). However, the primary impact of anxiety and dissociation may be to enhance bottom-up
perceptual processing. It is important to note that EST assumes that perceptual processes are
largely responsible for the identification of event boundaries (Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Zacks et al.,
2006). The segmentation system is set up to expect perceptual continuity of action and it is when
there is an error in that expectation that people perceive an event boundary. The increase in
segmentation agreement resulting from anxiety or dissociation could be interpreted as being
consistent with cognitive theories of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000),
but not in the manner that was assumed at the outset of the design of this study. If stressful
experiences engender greater attention to perceptual processing (Brewin et al., 2013; Brewin &
Mersaditabari, 2013; Morgan et al., 2006; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010), then it is reasonable to
expect that under stress, one could be more sensitive to perceptual change. According to EST,
this would increase the likelihood of perceiving event boundaries. While the two confounds
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raised above are important to consider, the fact that segmentation agreement under stress (i.e.,
anxiety and dissociation) was negatively correlated with memory performance lends credence to
the possibility that the results are consistent with the assumption of cognitive theories of PTSD
that oversensitivity to perceptual processing under stress may be an underlying mechanism for
poor event memory.

Implications for Theory

Does Stress Increase Segmentation Systematicity?

Following Possibility #3 (raised above), this dissertation’s results suggest that anxiety
and dissociation might increase attention to low-level perceptual cues, thus increasing the
systematicity of event segmentation because detecting perceptual change largely drives the
segmentation system. This interpretation is more parsimonious than the dissertation’s a priori
arguments because it does not invoke an explanation for how anxiety and dissociation might
impact top-down processes (e.g., the influence of event knowledge during updating). The view
that anxiety and dissociation increases systematicity via enhanced attention to perceptual change
is consistent with recent evidence indicating that the anxiety characteristic of “checking
proneness” predicts event segmentation behavior based on low-level perceptual cues (Belayachi
& Van der Linden, 2015). Thus, one general function of anxiety and dissociation may be to
enhance the detection of changes to perceptual stimulation, which can then increase
systematicity. To further investigate this possibility, other segmentation scoring strategies may
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be developed that can produce an objective standard that more strictly corresponds to changes in
sensory stimulation. For example, an objective standard can be constructed based on concrete
sensory alterations such as changes in sound volume, pixel color, or picture brightness.

Does Stress-Enhanced Segmentation Diminish Memory?

While high segmentation agreement scores typically predict high memory performance
(Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013), anxiety- and dissociationenhanced segmentation may represent the type of data-driven, perceptually hypervigilant
encoding that PTSD theories argue is a maladaptive process that leads to trauma-related memory
problems (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). What is very interesting (and unexpected)
about the possibility of a facilitative effect of anxiety and dissociation on segmentation is that the
current results indicate that high segmentation agreement had a negative impact on recognition
of the stressful film. This suggests that anxiety and dissociation may interfere with some
fundamental memory processes (encoding, storage, and retrieval). Although recall of the
stressful film was insignificantly related to segmentation agreement, the relationship also trended
in the negative direction. Recall and recognition tasks operate on similar cognitive processes but
recognition tasks use more retrieval cues than recall tasks (Kintsch, 1970). Given that some
participants may have been unwilling to engage in effortful retrieval of aversive content during
the recall task, the use of salient retrieval cues in the recognition task may have more reliably
assessed voluntary memory.
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Given that segmentation of stressful experiences had not been investigated until this
project, there is little precedent to suggest whether or not segmentation systematicity during
stressful events is an adaptive process. Rather, the current state of the literature suggests
systematicity within event segmentation simply refers to the extent to which one’s segmentation
behavior is consistent with an objective standard.
To understand the costs and benefits of segmentation systematicity, it is important to
understand the nature and implications of the objective standard. In the event segmentation
literature, the objective standard is typically based on narrative elements of a story (e.g., agent
goal states and interactions between agents and objects; Magliano, Miller, & Zwaan, 2001; Zacks
et al., 2009; Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). Studies on the segmentation of narratives
often view systematicity as an adaptive ability to reliably identify event boundaries only when
the current event model needs to be updated (e.g., when there is a break in narrative
comprehension). It is considered adaptive because it appears to enhance encoding efficiency and
the quality of the memory (Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Zacks & Swallow, 2007). However, in
comparison to typical objective standards used in studies on narrative comprehension, the nature
and implications of the Irréversible objective standard might be quite different. The Irréversible
objective standard not only represents a narrative structure but also a codification of aversive
content that unfolds in an iterative fashion (e.g., seven counts of perpetrator restraining victim’s
arm, four counts of perpetrator groping victim, three counts of perpetrator penetrating victim).
Systematically identifying the beginning and end of each violent action might not lead to a more
complete understanding or memory of the experience.

99
Is it possible that segmentation systematicity during a stressful experience might
negatively impact voluntary memory? Although the current results suggest that anxiety- and
dissociation-enhanced segmentation may have diminished voluntary memory, these unexpected
results require replication prior to making strong claims about adaptation. Future research can
explore the possibility that high systematicity during stressful experiences is the result of an
anxiety- or dissociation-related shift in the allocation of attentional resources. Specifically,
stressful responding may cue executive control (i.e., Engle 2022; Cowan, 1988) to shift from
understanding the narrative and toward detecting perceptual changes, which may manifest as
enhanced segmentation systematicity.

Can Stress-Enhanced Segmentation be Viewed as “Encoding Disruption?”

One theoretical account of encoding disruption is Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) idea of
“data-driven processing,” meaning the stress-enhanced processing of sensory impressions and
perceptual characteristics rather than processing the event’s underlying meaning in an organized
way. Given the possibility that stress responses such as anxiety and dissociation might increase
one’s sensitivity to detect perceptual change and thus increase segmentation systematicity, stressenhanced segmentation can be viewed as a form of data-driven processing. Ehlers and Clark
argue that to the extent that an individual engages in data-driven processing, the resulting
memory representation is believed to contain rich perceptual information that has a weak internal
structure (i.e., disorganized and incoherent information) and is not adequately integrated into
autobiographical memory, which makes it difficult for one to voluntarily search and retrieve
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information (for similar arguments, see Brewin et al., 1996). Consistent with this view, basic
memory research has shown that attending to sensory impressions of experimental stimuli results
in weaker memory performance than attending to the conceptual meaning of experimental
stimuli (García-Bajos, Migueles, & Aizpurua, 2014; Jacoby, 1983; Morris, Bransford, & Franks,
1977; Roediger, 1990). In the context of stressful experiences, studies using a self-report
measure of data-driven processing support the prediction that data-driven processing results in
trauma-related memory disturbance (Halligan et al., 2002, 2003; Laposa & Rector, 2012; Murray
et al., 2002; Regambal & Alden, 2009; Sündermann, Hauschildt, & Ehlers, 2013). If stressenhanced segmentation is viewed as a form of data-driven processing, these findings are
consistent with the current result that stress-enhanced segmentation negatively impacted
voluntary memory.

Implications Summary

Most of the planned analyses indicated significant effects in the opposite predicted
direction. When viewing high segmentation as a disrupted encoding characteristic during
stressful experiences (i.e., data-driven processing), then one would anticipate that (a)
segmentation agreement would be higher in the stressful film than the non-stressful film, (b)
anxiety and dissociation would increase segmentation agreement, (c) segmentation agreement
would negatively predict voluntary memory, and (d) anxiety and dissociation would reduce
voluntary memory indirectly through stress-enhanced segmentation agreement. Indeed, these are
the unpredicted yet significant results of the dissertation. These unpredicted statistically

101
significant effects warrant follow-up examination and suggest that the use of event segmentation
as a moment-to-moment marker of encoding disruption (or more specifically, data-driven
processing) may be theoretically and empirically viable. Further, these data suggest some merit
to the hybrid design that combines the SFP and the event segmentation task. This design may
serve as a valuable research tool to investigate a wealth of empirical questions regarding the
antecedents and consequences of peritraumatic processes.

Limitations

The major methodological limitations are the problematic stimuli (discussed earlier) and
problems that emerged from combining the SFP with the event segmentation task. Even without
the additional complications related to the event segmentation task, SFP research has
demonstrated a major limitation that the SFP may not reliably induce anxiety and dissociation
and elicit analog levels of trauma-related memory disturbance, especially voluntary memory
problems (Brewin, 2014). Contributing to the unreliability of the SFP is that the stressfulness of
the stimuli (e.g., Irréversible rape scene) is rarely standardized, which makes it difficult to assess
the “dose” of the stress induction.
Using unstandardized stress inducers is important when considering that many
performance tasks are affected by stress in a curvilinear fashion (e.g., Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).
Segmentation behavior may be facilitated by moderate levels of stress but then diminish
markedly at extreme levels of stress. If so, the Big Night scene may have been under-stimulating
for the event segmentation task while the Irréversible scene may have been stimulating enough
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to elicit peak performance. In support of this possibility, current findings suggest that greater
levels of anxiety and dissociation predicted higher segmentation agreement. However, since
there was no condition resembling “extreme” anxiety and dissociation levels often experienced
in actual traumatic experiences, the current data cannot test if segmentation is affected by stress
in a curvilinear fashion. If a curvilinear effect does exist, the current use of the SFP may have
been insufficient to elicit enough stress to decrease performance on the event segmentation task,
thus precluding the opportunity to test the PED hypothesis. To better control the dose of stress,
and to control problems emerging from differences in stressful vs. non-stressful materials, future
research can investigate the impact of stress on segmentation by administering substances such
as hydrocortisone to elevate participants’ cortisol to levels (e.g. Van Ast, Cornelisse, Meeter,
Joëls, & Kindt, 2013) while watching an inherently non-stressful film.
Yet another limitation of the STP is that the option for participants to voluntarily stop the
film could create a systematic bias in the final sample (i.e., those who watched the complete
film). Stopping the film early could indicate several characteristics including extreme distress, a
moral decision to not watch a reprehensible film, or even a general lack of engagement. To
temper this concern in the current project, independent-samples t-tests comparing stoppers to
non-stoppers indicated no statistically significant group differences (Table 12 in Appendix E).
However, non-significant trends suggest participants may have been more likely to stop the film
if they were unfamiliar with its “torture-porn” content and/or if they experienced the film as
highly distressing (anxiety, anger, and disgust). This potential systematic bias draws attention to
the need of future research to consider using means other than aversive film content to elicit
stress responses.
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If the SFP is unreliable, than task demands from the addition of the event segmentation
task may have further complicated matters. One possibility is that the event segmentation task
may have consumed working memory resources, which previous studies have shown can
diminish voluntary memory of stressful experiences (Bourne et al., 2010; Holmes et al., 2004;
Krans et al., 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Nixon et al., 2007). Participants who were highly motivated to
engage with the task during the stressful film may have experienced a strong cognitive load that
negatively impacted recall and recognition. Thus, one possible explanation of the unpredicted
findings is that participants varied in the extent to which they engaged in the segmentation task,
as level of engagement can explain (a) high segmentation scores due to enhanced attention and
(b) diminished voluntary memory due to reduced working memory during encoding. Although
some evidence suggests the event segmentation task does not introduce substantial task demands
(Zacks et al., 2001), more research is needed to understand how the event segmentation task
consumes working memory resources.
While the event segmentation task has strong inter-rater indices and test-retest indexes
(Newtson, 1976; Speer et al., 2003; Zacks et al., 2006) and is able to detect expected group
differences (Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013; Zacks et al., 2006),
no prior studies have validated the event segmentation task in the context of a stressful
experience. While the current study predicted that strong affective responses might impact event
segmentation as an encoding system, strong affective responses might have also interfered with
behavioral compliance of event segmentation as a laboratory task. Participants could have been
so surprised or shocked by the stressful film that they forgot to regularly continue pressing the
spacebar. Or, participants may have prioritized their own well being (e.g., engaging in self-
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soothing or temporarily choosing to discontinue) over complying with experimental instructions.
If participants did not engage in the segmentation task due to forgetting or prioritizing other
needs, than the cognitive system of event segmentation was not assessed adequately. The actual
manifestation of this limitation is difficult to assess. Future studies should consider including
procedural compliance checks to rule-out the possibility that poor segmentation results from
disengagement from the task.
Lastly, an important limitation to Magliano and colleagues’ (2005, 2013) approach to
constructing the objective standards is that it pre-sets the grain of segmentation units. Pre-setting
the theoretical grain size requires the current results to be interpreted with awareness of the
theoretical unit grain size to which participant responses were compared. The instructions used
for the event segmentation task was, “We want you to indicate the smallest units that you find
meaningful” (see Appendix F). This instruction could be interpreted by participants as
segmenting at a finer grain size than the objective standards. Thus, it is difficult to rule-out the
possibility that the current analyses did not reliably assess a fine-grained segmentation strategy.
However, given that results using objective agreement scores largely converged with normative
agreement scores, which do not pre-set grain sizes, the objective standards’ pre-set grain size
does not appear to be substantially problematic.

Conclusion

This dissertation executed a novel analog laboratory design to test the PED hypothesis
that stress responses such as anxiety and dissociation negatively affect encoding processes,
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which then results in memory disturbance (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This
dissertation introduced event segmentation as a potentially useful moment-to-moment marker of
encoding processes during a stressful experience. Although none of this dissertation’s
hypotheses were supported, significant results were found consistently in the opposite direction
of predictions. One possible interpretation of the results is that stress-enhanced segmentation
systematicity is due to the empirically established phenomenon of stress-enhanced attention to
low-level perceptual cues. This post-hoc interpretation should be reassessed in replication
efforts.
Interestingly, stress-enhanced segmentation appeared to diminish voluntary memory.
The negative relationship between segmentation of a stressful experience and memory
performance is drastically different from the effects found for non-stressful experiences, which
typically demonstrate a positive relationship (Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent
et al., 2013). These findings are consistent with theory that data-driven, perceptually
hypervigilant processing interferes with effective memory storage, thus resulting in weak
voluntary memory (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Replications and extensions of the current study can
further assess this theoretical perspective.
The dissertation’s evidence that the nature and function of event segmentation changes in
the context of stressful experiences can provide important insights for how and why
peritraumatic encoding might contribute to subsequent pathology. This evidence also has
implications for EST (Zacks et al., 2006), which can potentially account for a role of affect
within the segmentation system. Continued work in this area is encouraged to refine and
calibrate the current study’s methodological strategy. Although the significant findings were
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unexpected, the results suggest stress-induced changes to one typical encoding process (event
segmentation) can be measured within current paradigm. This is the first known study to
demonstrate that an encoding process during an analog traumatic event can be measured
moment-to-moment. Future researchers are encouraged to use and expand upon this novel
paradigm to replicate the current findings and gain a better understanding of the etiology of
trauma-related memory disturbance.
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Recruitment Materials for IRB
Participants will be recruited from the PSYC 102 participant pool. These participants sign up for
studies using a secure online experiment management system developed by Sona Systems, Ltd.
The URL is http://niu.sona-systems.com/. The proposed study will be listed on the website as
“Understanding Stressful Experiences.” The study will not be available for participants under 18
years old. The following statement will be used to recruit participants:
The purpose of this study is to better understand how individuals process and remember
non-stressful experiences and stressful experiences. First, participants will fill out a
series of questionnaires. Second, participants will watch a non-stressful film and a
stressful film. While watching the films, participants will engage in a task that measures
cognitive processes. Third, participants will complete a memory test for the films.
Participation may take up to two hours. The study is being conducted in the Psychology
Building.

APPENDIX B
OUTLINE OF STUDY PROCEDURES

126
Outline of Study Procedures
Phase One: Informed Consent
Phase Two: Survey Packet
1. Life Events Checklist for DSM-5 (LEC-5)
2. PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5)
3. Prior Film Exposure Questionnaire (PFEQ)
4. Demographics Questionnaire (DQ)
Phase Three: Script Assessment
1. Everyday event scripts
a. Getting ready for work
b. Shopping for groceries
c. Going out to dinner
2. Rape script
Phase Four: Orientation to Event Segmentation Task
Phase Five or Six (Counterbalanced): Non-Stressful Event Segmentation
1. Event segmentation task (stimuli: Breakfast scene from Big Night)
2. Cognitive, Affective, and Visual Engagement Assessment Tests (CAVEAT)
Phase Six or Five (Counterbalanced): Stressful Event Segmentation
1. State measurement questionnaires (Time One):
a. State/Trait Anxiety Index (STAI-S6)
b. Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences Scale (PDEQ-7)
2. Event segmentation task (stimuli: Rape scene from Irréversible)
3. State measurement questionnaires (Time Two):
a. State/Trait Anxiety Index (STAI-S6)
b. Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences Scale (PDEQ-7)
4. Cognitive, Affective, and Visual Engagement Assessment Tests (CAVEAT)
Phase Seven or Eight (Counterbalanced): Non-Stressful Event Recall Assessment
Phase Eight or Seven (Counterbalanced): Stressful Event Recall and Recognition Assessment
1. Event recall
2. Event recognition
Phase Nine: Positive Mood Induction and Debriefing
1. Positive mood induction
2. Debriefing

APPENDIX C
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Prior Film Exposure Questionnaire (PFEQ)
Directions:
Please indicate how many times you have seen the following films using the following scale:
? = “I have never heard of it.”
0 = “I have heard of it but I have never seen it.”
1 = “I have seen it only once.”
>1 = “I have seen it more than once.”
Film
1CF
2 TP
3 CF
4 TP
5 TP
6 CF
7 TP
8 CF
9 CF
10 TP
11 TP
12 CF
13 CF
14 TP
15 EX
16 EX

The Notebook [2004; Director: Nick Cassavetes; Lead: Ryan Gosling]
Saw [2004; Director: James Wan; Lead: Cary Elwes]
Ghost [1990; Director: Jerry Zucker; Lead: Patrick Swayze]
A Serbian Film [2010; Director: Srđan Spasojević; Lead: Sergej Trifunović]
The Devil’s Rejects [2005; Director: Rob Zombie; Lead: Sid Haig]
27 Dresses [2008; Director: Anne Fletcher; Lead: Katherine Heigl]
I Spit on Your Grave [2010; Director: Steven Monroe; Lead: Sarah Butler]
Steel Magnolias [1989; Director: Herbert Ross; Lead: Sally Field]
Beaches [1988; Director: Garry Marshall; Lead: Bette Midler]
The Human Centipede [2009; Director: Tom Six; Lead: Dieter Laser]
Final Destination [2000; Director: James Wong; Lead: Devon Sawa]
Notting Hill [1999; Director: Roger Michell; Lead: Julia Roberts]
Dear John [2010; Director: Lasse Hallström; Lead: Channing Tatum]
Hostel [2005; Director: Eli Roth; Lead: Jay Hernandez]
Irréversible [2002; Director: Gaspar Noé; Lead: Monica Bellucci]
Big Night [1996; Directors: Campbell Scott; Lead: Stanley Tucci]

?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

Seen It?
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1
>1

Exclusionary instructions: The participant must discontinue the study if items 15EX and/or 16EX
indicates one or more viewings of the study’s stimuli (Irréversible and Big Night).
Scoring instructions: First, recode original responses [?, 0, 1, >1] into exposure scale [0, 1, 2, 3].
Second, average all items labeled “CF” for “chick-flick exposure” and all items labeled “TP” for
“torture-porn exposure.” (When given to participants, the PFEQ will not include item notations
[i.e., EX, CF, and TP].)
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LEC-5/PCL-5: Part One
Directions:
Listed below are a number of difficult or stressful things that sometimes happen to people. For each event
check one or more of the boxes to the right to indicate that: (a) it happened to you personally; (b) you
witnessed it happen to someone else; (c) you learned about it happening to a close family member or
close friend; (d) you were exposed to it as part of your job (for example, paramedic, police, military, or
other first responder); or (e) you’re not sure if it fits.
Be sure to consider your entire life (growing up as well as adulthood) as you go through the list of events.

Event
1
2

Natural disaster (for example, flood, hurricane,
tornado, earthquake)
Fire or explosion

12

Transportation accident (for example, car accident,
boat accident, train wreck, plane crash)
Serious accident at work, home, or during
recreational activity
Exposure to toxic substance (for example,
dangerous chemicals, radiation)
Physical assault (for example, being attacked, hit,
slapped, kicked, beaten up)
Assault with a weapon (for example, being shot,
stabbed, threatened with a knife, gun, bomb)
Sexual assault (rape, attempted rape, made to
perform any type of sexual act through force or
threat of harm)
Other unwanted or uncomfortable sexual
experience
Combat or exposure to a war-zone (in the military
or as a civilian)
Captivity (for example, being kidnapped,
abducted, held hostage, prisoner of war)
Life-threatening illness or injury

13

Severe human suffering

14

Sudden violent death (for example, homicide,
suicide)
Sudden accidental death

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

15
16
17

Serious injury, harm, or death you caused to
someone else
Any other very stressful event or experience

Happened
to me

Witnessed
it

Learned
about it

Part of
my job

Not
sure
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LEC-5/PCL-5: Part Two
A. If you checked anything for #17 in PART ONE, briefly identify the event you were thinking of:
__________________________________________________________________
B. If you have experienced more than one of the events in PART ONE, think about the event you
consider the worst event, which for this questionnaire means the event that currently bothers you the most.
If you have experienced only one of the events in PART ONE, use that one as the worst event. Please
answer the following questions about the worst event (check all options that apply):
1

Briefly describe the worst event (for example, what happened, who was involved, etc.):

_________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

2

How long ago did it happen?
_____________ (please estimate if you are not sure)

3

How did you experience it?
____ It happened to me directly
____ I witnessed it
____ I learned about it happening to a close family member or close friend
____ I was repeatedly exposed to details about it as part of my job (for example, paramedic, police, military,
or other first responder)
____ Other, please describe: _________________________________________________________

4

Was someone’s life in danger?
____ Yes, my life
____ Yes, someone else’s life
____ No
Was someone seriously injured or killed?
____ Yes, I was seriously injured
____ Yes, someone else was seriously injured or killed
____ No
Did it involve sexual violence? ____ Yes ____ No

5

6
7

8

If the event involved the death of a close family member or close friend, was it due to some kind of accident or
violence, or was it due to natural causes?
____ Accident or violence
____ Natural causes
____ Not applicable (The event did not involve the death of a close family member or close friend)
How many times altogether have you experienced a similar event as stressful or nearly as stressful as the worst
event?
____ Just once
____ More than once (please specify or estimate the total # of times you have had this experience _____)
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LEC-5/PCL-5: Part Three
Directions:
Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have in response to a very stressful experience.
Keeping your worst event in mind (Part Two), please read each problem carefully and then circle one of
the numbers to the right to indicate how much you have been bothered by that problem in the past month.
In the past month, how much were you bothered by:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Not
at all

A little
bit

Moderately

Quite
a bit

Extremely

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Feeling jumpy or easily startled?

0

1

2

3

4

Having difficulty concentrating?

0

1

2

3

4

Trouble falling or staying asleep?

0

1

2

3

4

Repeated, disturbing, and unwanted memories of the
stressful experience?
Repeated, disturbing, and unwanted memories of the
stressful experience?
Suddenly feeling or acting as if the stressful experience
were actually happening again (as if you were actually
back there reliving it)?
Feeling very upset when something reminded you of
the stressful experience?
Having strong physical reactions when something
reminded you of the stressful experience (e.g., heart
pounding, trouble breathing, sweating)?
Avoiding memories, thoughts, or feelings related to the
stressful experience?
Avoiding external reminders of the stressful experience
(e.g., people, places, conversations, activities, objects,
or situations)?
Trouble remembering important parts of the stressful
experience?
Having strong negative beliefs about yourself, other
people, or the world (e.g., having thoughts such as: I
am bad, there is something seriously wrong with me, no
one can be trusted, the world is completely dangerous)?
Blaming yourself or someone else for the stressful
experience or what happened after it?
Having strong negative feelings such as fear, horror,
anger, guilt, or shame?
Loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy?
Feeling distant or cut off from other people?
Trouble experiencing positive feelings (e.g., being
unable to feel happiness or have loving feelings for
people close to you)?
Irritable behavior, angry outbursts, or acting
aggressively?
Taking too many risks or doing things that could cause
you harm?
Being “superalert” or watchful or on guard?
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Demographics Questionnaire (DQ)
Instructions: Below is a list of questions about your identity and life circumstances. Please answer each
question to the best of your ability.

1
Age: ______
2
Gender (circle one):

MALE

FEMALE

OTHER: ______

3
Hispanic/Latino(a) ethnicity (circle one): YES

NO

4
Race (circle all that apply):
1. Asian or Asian-American
2. Black or African-American
3. Indigenous American (North, Central, or South American, Pacific Islander)
4. White or European-American
5. Other: ____________
5
How would you describe your sexual orientation?
1. Heterosexual
2. Homosexual
3. Other: ____________
6
How many credit hours of college have you completed? ______
7
What languages do you speak? _______________________________________________
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Cognitive, Affective, and Visual Engagement Assessment Tests (CAVEAT)
I Instructions: Mark the choice that best describes your
experiences and reactions during the film.

Not at all Barely Somewhat Mostly Completely

0
1

I paid close attention to the film.

2

I shared the perspective of the victim (or, omeletmaker).

3

I felt empathy for the victim (or, omelet-maker).

4

I identified with the victim (or, omelet-maker).

II Instructions: Mark the choice that best describes your
experiences and reactions during the film.

I experienced anger.

2

I experienced joy.

3

I experienced sadness.

4

I experienced disgust.

5

I experienced fear.

2

3

4

Not at all Barely Somewhat Mostly Completely

0
1

1

1

III Instructions: Mark the choice that best describes your
experiences and reactions during the film.

2

3

Answer

1

Estimate the number of times you looked away from the screen. If you
never looked away, write zero (0).

_____ Times

2

Estimate the number of times you closed your eyes for an extended period
of time. If you never closed your eyes, write zero (0).
Note: Don’t include normal eye blinks.

_____ Times

3

Estimate the number of times you covered your eyes with your clothes,
hands, or other body parts. If you never covered your eyes, write zero (0).

_____ Times

4

Estimate the total percentage of time (range: 0% to 100%) that you were
looking directly at the screen.

_____ %

4
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State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S6; Marteau & Bekker, 1992)
Instructions: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each
statement and then mark the most appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate how you feel right
now, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but
give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
Not at All
1
1 I feel calm
2 I am tense
3 I feel upset
4 I am relaxed
5 I feel content
6 I am worried
Please make sure that you have answered all the questions.

Somewhat
2

Moderately
3

Very Much
4
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Peritraumatic Dissociative Experience Q. (PDEQ-7; Marmar et al., 1997)
Instructions: Please complete the items below by marking the
choice that best describes your experiences and reactions
Not at Slightly SomeVery
during the film and immediately afterward. If an item does not all true
true what true true
apply to your experience, please mark “Not at all true.”
1

2

3

4

Extremely
true
5

I had moments of losing track of what was going on — I
1 “blanked out” or “spaced out” or in some way felt that I
was not part of what was going on.
2

My sense of time changed — things seemed to be
happening in slow motion.

I felt as though I were spectator watching what was
3 happening to me, as if I were ﬂoating above the scene or
observing it as an outsider.
There were moments when my sense of my own body
4 seemed distorted or changed. I felt disconnected from my
own body, or it was unusually large or small.
I felt as though things that were actually happening to
5 others were happening to me — like I was being trapped
when I really wasn't.
6

I felt confused; that is, there were moments when I had
difﬁculty making sense of what was happening.

7

I felt disoriented; that is, there were moments when I felt
uncertain about where I was or what time it was.

Removed items: The original PDEQ includes 10 items. However, three items were not
appropriate due to the laboratory context. These items include:
• I found that I was on “automatic pilot” — I ended up doing things that I later realized I
hadn't actively decided to do.
• What was happening seemed unreal to me, like I was in a dream, or watching a movie or
play.
• I was surprised to ﬁnd afterwards that a lot of things happened at the time that I was not
aware of, especially things I ordinarily would have noticed.
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Script Assessment (Part 1)
Instructions:
Your task is to write all the steps involved in three experiences that some people have. You will
be given a total of three minutes to complete this task. Please write in as much detail as possible
and include every step from the beginning of each experience to the end of each experience.
The experiences you will write about are (1) getting ready for work, (2) shopping for groceries,
and (3) going out to dinner.
Topic:
Getting ready
for work

Shopping for
groceries

Going out to
dinner

Answer:
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Everyday Event Script Scoring Key (Rosen et al., 2003)
Scripts
Step
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Getting Ready for Work
Turn off alarm
Wake up
Get out of bed
Go to bathroom
Brush teeth
Take a shower
Shave
Get dressed
Style/fix hair
Put on makeup
Prepare breakfast
Eat breakfast
Read newspaper
Pack lunch/snacks
Gather belongings/keys
Leave house
Get in car
Drive/go to work

Shopping for Groceries
Determine items needed
Make grocery list
Cut/gather coupons
Get in car to go shopping
Drive/go to store
Park car at store
Get shopping cart
Enter store
Go down aisles
Shop for groceries
Go to checkout area
Put groceries on belt
Pay cashier
Bring bags to car
Put groceries in car
Drive/go home
Unload car
Put groceries away

Going Out to Dinner
Decide on restaurant
Call and make reservation
Take a shower
Get dressed
Get in car
Drive/go to restaurant
Enter restaurant
Give name to host/hostess
Wait to be seated
Be seated/go to table
Look at dinner menu
Order drinks/wine
Order dinner/meal
Make conversation
Eat dinner
Ask for/wait for/get check
Pay check
Drive/go home
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Script Assessment (Part 2)
Instructions:
Your task is to write all the steps involved in one experience that some people have. You will
be given a total of three minutes to complete this task. Please write in as much detail as possible
and include every step from the beginning of the experience to the end of the experience.
The experience you will write about is male-to-female rape.
Important: Use your own idea about what “rape” means but describe the steps involved in maleto-female rape. That is, write about a specific but hypothetical rape of a female victim by a male
perpetrator. Include all the events leading up to the rape, during the rape, and after the rape.
Also, include characteristics of the victim and the perpetrator.
Topic:
Answer:
Male-to-Female
Rape
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Typical Rape Script Scoring Key
Theme
Setting characteristics
Relationship between
victim and perpetrator
Number of
perpetrators
Location

Typical Rape

N/A

Atypical Rape

Score: +1

Score: 0

Score: -1

Stranger (e.g., met
that night)
One (i.e., use of
singular nouns)
Public (e.g., parties,
school, parks)
Barrier contraceptive
No (i.e., must be
used
explicitly absent)
Perpetrator characteristics
Physical assault
Yes (e.g., attack,
before sexual assault
push, grab, constrain)
Physical assault
Yes (e.g., attack,
during sexual assault
push, grab, constrain)
Threats of physical
Yes (e.g., “don't
assault (anytime)
scream or I’ll…”)
Possession of weapon Yes (e.g., knife or
gun)
Yelling or derogatory Yes (e.g., says shut
language
up, calls victim a slut)
Vaginal or anal
Yes (e.g., inside/into
penetration with penis victim)
Sexual pleasure
Yes (e.g., enjoys,
experienced
likes it, orgasm)
Victim characteristics
Alone when contacted Yes (e.g., left
by perpetrator
party/bar alone)
Screams/yells/cries to Yes (e.g., nonverbally
get help
screams, yells help)
Unambiguous verbal
Yes (e.g., says no)
requests to stop
Attempts to physically Yes (e.g. fights back)
resist
Crying
Yes (e.g., teary eyed,
bawling)
Sexual pleasure
No (i.e., must be
experienced
explicitly absent)

N/A (i.e., no mention
of relationship)
N/A (i.e., mixture or
singular/plural)
N/A (i.e., no mention
of location)
N/A (i.e., no mention
of contraceptive)

Non-stranger (e.g.,
known previously)
>1 perpetrator or
accomplice
Private (e.g., victim
knows owner/renter)
Yes (e.g., diaphragm,
male/female condom)

N/A (e.g., rape,
inappropriate)
N/A (e.g., rape,
inappropriate)
N/A (e.g., coercive or
“slimy” talk)
N/A (e.g., sedatives)

No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)

N/A (e.g., coercive
“slimy” talk)
N/A (e.g., rape, have
sex, assault)
N/A (e.g., finishes
sexual assault)
N/A (i.e., initial
contact not explicit)
N/A (e.g., gets help
after, calls police)
N/A (e.g., fights back)
N/A (e.g., says no)
N/A (e.g., sad, upset,
in shock)
N/A (e.g., gives up
resistance)

No (e.g., victim with
friends at bar/party)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
No (i.e., must be
explicitly absent)
Yes (e.g., enjoys,
likes it, orgasm)
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Table 12
Comparisons Between Film Stoppers vs. Non-Stoppers
Variable

Group Statistics
Group
n
M

Prior Film Exposure Questionnaire,
Torture-Porn Scale

Non-Stoppers 73

PCL-5 (PTSD Symptoms)
Everyday Event Scripts

3.20

28

6.07

3.04

Non-Stoppers 73

9.37

7.91

28

10.11

8.53

Non-Stoppers 73

12.45

4.10

28

11.46

4.83

Non-Stoppers 73

Stoppers
Stoppers
Stoppers

Typical Rape Scripts

1.03

99

.305

0.41

99

.886

-1.94

99

.055

16.16

4.76

28

18.18

4.41

Non-Stoppers 73

10.62

3.71

-0.36

99

.723

10.93
2.77

4.55
1.34

-1.71

99

.091

28

3.25

1.08

Non-Stoppers 73

0.08

0.43

1.00

99

.319

28

0.00

0.00

Non-Stoppers 73

2.74

1.23

-1.37

99

.175

28

3.11

1.17

Non-Stoppers 73

3.59

0.76

-1.79

99

.077

28

3.86

0.36

Non-Stoppers 73

1.79

1.43

-1.06

99

.291

1.58
0.87

99

.386

-1.16

99

.248

28

Non-Stoppers 73

Stoppers
CAVEAT: Fear (Irréversible)

.683

Non-Stoppers 73

Stoppers
CAVEAT: Disgust (Irréversible)

99

1.73

Stoppers
CAVEAT: Sadness (Irréversible)

-0.41

1.91

Stoppers
CAVEAT: Joy (Irréversible)

.040

2.39

Stoppers
CAVEAT: Anger (Irréversible)

99

2.45

Stoppers
PDEQ-7 (State Dissociation)

2.09

28

Stoppers
STAI-S6 (State Anxiety)

SD

7.53

t-test for Equality of Means
t
df
p

28

2.14

Percentage of Time Looking at Screen
(Irréversible)

Non-Stoppers 73

94.16

9.04

28

92.18

12.94

Age

Non-Stoppers 73

19.44

1.82

19.89

1.60

Stoppers
Stoppers
Stoppers

28

Notes. To reduce the likelihood of a Type 1 Error resulting from 13 simultaneous comparisons, a
Bonferroni correction was used to adjust the conventional .05 p-value to .004 (.05/13). Before
conducting each independent samples t-test, a Levene’s test was conducted to test at the 0.05
level the null hypothesis that that the variances of the two populations from which the samples
were drawn are equal. The null was rejected for joy, F(1, 99) = 4.26, p = .042, which was likely
due to floor effects of the stoppers. Additionally, the null was rejected for disgust, F(1, 99) =
12.63, p = .001, which was likely due to ceiling effects for the stoppers.

APPENDIX F
EVENT SEGMENTATION TASK INSTRUCTIONS

144
Event Segmentation Task Instructions
1. Instructions for practice trial of non-stressful event segmentation task: “The next part of
this study involves you watching some films. First, I want to remind you that participation in
this study is voluntary and you may discontinue watching any of the films at any time
without penalty. You can choose to stop the film by pressing this button – the one labeled
‘stop.’ Okay, now I’m going to tell you what you’re going to be doing while watching this
film. While watching each film on this monitor, you’re going to press the spacebar of this
keyboard after each meaningful unit of activity ends and another meaningful unit of activity
begins. We want you to indicate the smallest units that you find meaningful. Okay, let’s
begin. I’ll be standing in the hallway but looking at you through the window.
• Shaping feedback during practice trials: If the participant presses the spacebar
fewer than six times, tell the participant: “We need to complete the task one more
time, but this time indicate a few more meaningful units of activity.”
• Response to any question on the task: If the participant asks for clarification on
how to complete the task, tell the participant: “While watching each film, press
spacebar after each meaningful unit of activity ends and another meaningful unit of
activity begins. We want you to indicate the smallest units that you find meaningful.
Let’s see how you do on this first film.”
2. Instructions for non-stressful event segmentation task: “Thanks for your effort on the first
film. The second film is going to be a little bit longer. Remember that the stop button is
available. Also, remember to press the spacebar after each meaningful unit of activity ends.
Indicate the smallest units that you find meaningful. Okay, let’s begin.”
• Returning with questionnaire packet: “Alright, before you watch the next film, I
would like you to complete this small questionnaire packet. When you’re done, place
the questionnaire packet in this tray.”
3. Instructions for stressful event segmentation task: “Thanks again for your effort thus far.
We have one more film. Remember that the stop button is available. And, like before,
remember to press the spacebar after each meaningful unit of activity ends. Indicate the
smallest units that you find meaningful. Okay, let’s begin.”
• Returning with questionnaire packet: “Thanks again for your effort. [If “stop”
button pressed: “It’s perfectly fine that you wanted to stop watching the film.”] I
would now like you to complete this small questionnaire packet. When you’re done,
place the questionnaire packet in the tray.”
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Event Recall Task
Write everything that happened in the film.
Include as much detail as possible and use the same order of actions.
You will be given seven minutes.
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Informed Consent Form
I agree to participate in the research project titled “Understanding Stressful Experiences” being conducted
by Andrew M. Sherrill, M.A., a graduate student in the clinical psychology program at Northern Illinois
University (NIU), under the supervision of Joe Magliano, Ph.D. and Michelle Lilly, Ph.D., faculty
members of NIU’s psychology department. I have been informed that the purpose of the study is to better
understand how individuals process and understand stressful experiences.
I understand that if I agree to participate in this study, I will be asked to answer several questionnaires that
will take approximately 30 minutes to complete. Next, I will be asked to watch several short films that
vary in the extent that they depict violent events and brief nudity. While watching these films, I will
make judgments that reflect how I am understanding the films. Lastly, I have been informed that after I
watch each film, I will be asked about my understanding of each film. In total, participation may last
from 90 minutes to 120 minutes.
I am aware that my participation is voluntary and may be withdrawn at any time without penalty or
prejudice. In addition, I am aware that if I have any questions concerning this study, I may contact Dr.
Joe Magliano at 815-753-0805 or Dr. Michelle Lilly at 815-753-4602. I understand that if I wish further
information regarding my rights as a research subject, I may contact the Office of Research Compliance
at NIU at 815-753-8588.
I understand that the intended benefit of this study is to advance the field of psychology by identifying
problematic cognitive processes that often result from stressful experiences. I have been informed that
the potential risk I could experience during this study include possible discomfort associated with viewing
graphic material. I have been informed that I can stop the film at any point by pressing a button labeled
“stop.” I understand that all information gathered during this experiment will be kept confidential. I
realize that NIU does not provide compensation or insurance for injury or illness incurred as a result of
participation in NIU-sponsored research projects.
I hereby state that I am 18 years or older. I understand that my consent to participate in this project does
not constitute a waiver of any legal rights or redress I might have as a result of my participation. Lastly, I
acknowledge that I have received a copy of this consent form.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Signature of Subject
Date
__________________________________________________________________________________
Signature of Witness
Date
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Positive Mood Induction Story
Instructions: Below is a story rated as one of the most uplifting stories of 2011. This story is
intended to promote a positive mood in the reader. Please read the story while feeling positive.
Grandmother graduates college after 42 years
Thursday was the graduation day a Hamden grandmother has been looking forward to for 42
years. Dora Anne Council, 76, was among the 870 graduates to receive their diplomas at
Gateway Community College Thursday night.
“They said, ‘Grandma, you’re one of a kind.’ But I’m not one of kind because all you have to do
is want something bad enough,” Council said.
In 1969, she first enrolled in what was then called South Central Community College. Shortly
after, she decided to put her education on hold to help support her family.
“I wanted to go to college when I was young, but I knew I couldn’t because I had to get a job,”
Council said. “I lucked out and got a job as a telephone operator and that was a good
accomplishment.”
Thirty years later, she decided it was time to go back to school, and she had the full support of
her family when she went back to what is now Gateway Community College.
“I told her, ‘Look mom, you want to go back. It’s your turn now,’” her son, Jimmy-Lee Moore,
said. “Hey, I have the money, I’ll pay for whatever you need. You let me know.”
On Thursday night, Council sat amongst her classmates, most of whom are around the same age
as her grandchildren.
“They think I’m so smart. I said, ‘I’m no smarter than you are,’” Council said. “The answers
are in the book.”
When Dora’s name was called out, there was a huge round of applause.
“It feels wonderful! Wonderful! Wonderful!” she exclaimed following graduation. She
received an associate degree in general studies.
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Debriefing Form
Thank you for participating in our study!
As you will recall, the purpose of the study is to better understand how individuals process and
understand stressful experiences. This information could be used to develop more effective
psychotherapies for individuals with histories of stressful and traumatic experiences. Your
participation in this project will help us advance our understanding of the origins of debilitating
conditions like posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
For further reading on the topic of memories of stressful experiences, please see:
Brewin, C. R. (2011). The nature and significance of memory disturbance in posttraumatic stress
disorder. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 7, 203-227.
Holmes, E. A., & Bourne, C. (2008). Inducing and modulating intrusive emotional memories: A
review of the trauma film paradigm. Acta Psychologica, 127, 553-566. doi:10.1016/j.
actpsy.2007.11.002
Zacks, J. M., & Sargent, J. Q. (2010). Event perception: A theory and its application to clinical
neuroscience. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 53, 253-299. doi:10.1016/
S0079-7421(10)53007The information you provided in this study will be stored in a secure database and filing cabinet.
You will receive credit for PSYC 102 via SONA Systems following your participation. Please
keep this sheet for documentation of your participation. Again, if you have any questions about
this study, please contact either Dr. Joe Magliano (815-753-0805 or jmagliano@niu.edu) or Dr.
Michelle Lilly (815-753-4602 or mlilly1@niu.edu). If you have questions about your rights as a
research participant, contact the Office of Research Compliance at 815-753-8588 or via email at
researchcompliance@niu.edu.
Thank you!

APPENDIX L
COUNSELING RESOURCES IN DEKALB

157
Counseling Resources in DeKalb
DeKalb and Northern Illinois University are fortunate in having several free or low-cost
counseling services available to the community. This list is intended to help you find timely and
appropriate assistance. Sometimes one agency will have a high demand for services that
necessitates a waiting period for new clients, or you may have personal reasons for choosing one
agency over another. Counselors at any of these agencies will gladly assist you in making a final
decision about where to seek help.
CAMPUS SERVICES
COUNSELING AND STUDENT DEVELOPMENT CENTER
Phone: 815-753-1206
Address: Campus Life Building – 200
Fees: None for counseling, modest testing fees.
Hours: Monday–Friday 8:00 am–4:30 pm; open whenever NIU is open, including breaks
Description of Services: This service provides students with short-term, individual and group
counseling for a broad range of personal concerns. Career counseling services include interest
assessment, workshops, and use of computerized career counseling programs. Educational
counseling services include assistance with test anxiety and study skills. Assessments of drug
and alcohol abuse are also provided. First appointment scheduled within 3-7 days.
COUNSELING LABORATORY
Phone: 815-753-9312
Address: 416 Graham Hall
Fees: None for students, faculty, or staff.
Hours: Call for available counseling hours.
Description of Services: A wide range of services is offered by the counselors including both
personal and vocational counseling. In general, the approach used is one that promotes growth
and focuses on increasing emotional well-being and self-awareness. All counselors are either
doctoral or masters level students who are being supervised by members of the counseling
faculty. First appointments scheduled within 3-5 days.
FAMILY CENTER
Phone: 815-753-1684
Address: 429 Garden Road
Fees: $5.00 per session fee for students; faculty, staff, and community members charged on a
sliding scale; no one will be denied services due to inability to pay.
Hours: Wednesday 2:00 pm–10:00 pm; Thursday 10:00 am–10:00 pm; by appointment Monday
through Friday; open whenever NIU is open, including breaks.
Description of Services: Individual, couple, and family counseling. Services provided by
graduate students under the supervision of Marriage and Family Therapy faculty. First
appointment scheduled within 4 days.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES CENTER
Phone: 815-753-0591
Address: Normal Road and Lincoln Hwy
Fees: No fee for students; faculty, staff, and community members charged on a sliding scale.
Hours: Monday 12:00 pm–8:00 pm; Tuesday 11:00 am–7:00 pm; Wednesday–Friday 9:00 am–
5:00 pm; open whenever NIU is open, including breaks
Description of Services: Individual, couples, family, and group psychotherapy, Intellectual,
personality, and academic assessments. Clients are generally seen by advanced level graduate
student staff under faculty supervision. Services tailored to meet a client’s specific needs.
UNIVERSITY RESOURCES FOR WOMEN
Phone: 815-753-0320
Address: 105 Normal Road
Fees: No fee for students, faculty or staff
Hours: Monday – Friday 8:00 am – 4:30 pm; evening hours by appointment; open whenever
NIU is open, including breaks.
Description of Services: Short-term counseling to individuals about their academic progress,
careers, personal development, and other special concerns. Offered also are support groups,
information and referral, issues regarding workplace disputes, and issues involving sexual
harassment.
COMMUNITY RESOURCES
BEN GORDON COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTER
Phone: 815-756-4875 and 1-866-242-0111 (Crisis Line)
Address: 12 Health Services Drive – DeKalb
Fees: Sliding fee scale based on income. Insurance accepted.
Hours: Monday-Thursday: 8:00 am–8:30 pm Friday: 8:00 am–5:00 pm
Description of Services: Comprehensive counseling services to all residents of DeKalb County.
Services to all persons affected by mental health problems, substance abuse, family/child welfare
concerns. 24-hour sexual assault/abuse services can be accessed through the Crisis Line. First
appointment scheduled within 30 days.
FAMILY SERVICE AGENCY, CENTER FOR COUNSELING
Phone: 815-758-8636
Address: 14 Health Services Drive – DeKalb
Fees: $75.00 per visit, insurance accepted, including NIU Student Insurance, payment plans and
scholarship funds available.
Hours: Monday–Wednesday: 9:00 am–8:00 pm, Thursday–Friday: 8:00 am–4:00 pm, additional
hours available by appointment.
Description of Services: Individual, couple, group counseling for children, adults, senior citizens,
and families. First appointment scheduled within 1-7 days.
Private counselors, clinical social workers, and psychologists are available in the yellow
pages of the phone book under “Psychologist” or “Mental Health Services. ”
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Explicit Events of Big Night
Stanley Tucci “Egg Cooker” Events (including fine-grained subcomponents)
ST1
ST2
ST3
ST4
ST5
ST6
ST7
ST8
ST9
ST10
ST11
ST12
ST13
ST14
ST15
ST16
ST17
ST18
ST19
ST20
ST21
ST22
ST23

Enter room from main door (walk through door, stop after several feet, look around, rub eyes)
Get eggs (reach for bowl of eggs, remove bowl from shelf, walk to counter, place bowl on counter)
Get pan (reach for pan, take pan off rack, place pan on stove)
Communicate with MA (ST: “Are you hungry?” MA: nonverbal communication, ST: “I’ll do it”)
Ignite stove (reach for knob, turn knob, adjust flame)
Oil pan (reach/pick-up oil, pour oil, put oil down)
Crack eggs (reach for individual eggs, lift eggs from bowl, crack eggs, throw eggshells away)
Scramble eggs (reach/pick-up fork, place fork in bowl of unshelled eggs, scramble, remove fork, put fork down)
Season eggs (reach for seasoning, pinch seasoning, put seasoning in eggs)
Cook eggs (put eggs in pan, adjust flame, reach/pick-up spatula, manipulate/flip eggs, put down spatula, turn off stove)
Gather table setting for ST and MA (walk to cupboard, reach/pick-up 2 forks, reach/pick-up 2 plates)
Set table for ST and MA (walk to main table, place 2 forks on table, place 2 plates on table)
Serve eggs to ST and MA (reach/pick-up pan, reach/pick-up spatula, walk to table, divide eggs, serve eggs on 2 plates)
Place remaining eggs on stove (flip remaining eggs, puts spatula in pan, place the pan on the stove)
Serve bread to ST and MA (reach/pick-up bread, place bread on MA’s plate, give MA plate, break bread for ST)
Sit down at table (pull chair out, sit down, scoot chair in) [before/after TS]
Eat breakfast (reach/pick-up fork, eat eggs with fork, reach/pick-up bread, eat bread with hand) [before/after TS]
React to TS’s entrance (turn head toward TS, look at TS, maintain stare at TS)
Gather table setting for TS (walk to cupboard, reach/pick-up 1 fork, reach/pick-up 1 plate)
Set table for TS (walk to table, place 1 fork on table, place 1 plate on table)
Serve eggs to TS (reach/pick-up pan with eggs and spatula, serve eggs on 1 plate, place pan/spatula on stove)
Serves bread to TS (reach for and put bread into basket, place basket near TS’s seat)
Hug TS (look at TS eating, put arm around TS, remove arm from TS)

Marc Anthony “Egg Eater #1” Events (including fine-grained subcomponents)
MA1
MA2
MA3
MA4
MA5
MA6
MA7
MA8
MA9
MA10
MA11
MA12
MA13
MA14
MA15

Sleep (lay on table, keep eyes closed) [note: this could be a description, but since it ends we’re counting it as an event]
Wake up (open eyes, look around, sit up, stretches neck)
Nod in affirmative to ST’s question (look at ST when spoken to, nod) [note: MA doesn’t say “yes” or anything else]
Get off table (swing legs over table edge, slide off table, stand on floor)
Stretch body (walk around room, stretch back, stretch legs using corner table for support)
Get bread (reach for and gather bread from corner table, walk to table, place bread on table)
Kneel/squat near table (walk next to table, drop down to knees or squat, place elbows on table) [“sitting” okay too]
Look at ST cooking
Sit on butcher block (stand up, walk to butcher block, climb onto butcher block)
Snack on piece of bread (reach for and pick up bread from basket, eat bread)
Say thank you to ST (reach for and grab plate with eggs from ST, “grazie”)
Eat breakfast (eat eggs with fork, build eggs sandwich, eat egg sandwich)
Look at ST and TS hug
Get off butcher block (slide off table, stand on floor)
Leave kitchen (walk to exit door, walk through exit door)

Tony Shalhoub “Egg Eater #2” Events (including fine-grained subcomponents)
TS1
TS2
TS3
TS4
TS5
TS6

Enter room from exit door (walk through door, stop after several feet, look around, touch pants, touch pasta maker)
React to ST’s stare (briefly look at ST, divert additional eye contact)
Move chair to table (reach/pick-up chair, walk to table, place chair in front of table)
Sit down at table (sit down, scoot chair in)
Eat breakfast (reach/pick-up fork, eat eggs with fork, reach/pick-up bread, eat bread with hand)
Hug ST (put arm around ST, remove arm from ST)
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Explicit Events of Irréversible
Jo Prestia “Perpetrator” Events (including fine-grained subcomponents)
JP1
JP2
JP3
JP4
JP5
JP6
JP7
JP8
JP9
JP10
JP11
JP12
JP13
JP14
JP15
JP16
JP17
JP18
JP19
JP20
JP21
JP22
JP23
JP24

Enter hallway (walk into hallway, stop after about ten feet)
Pin C against wall (push C’s back against wall, step immediately in front of C)
Assault C (choke C, slap C, punch C, knee C, bring C to ground, drag C)
Speak to C (yell [not talk] at C while pointing)
Look a V (look at/attends to/notices V while attacking C, maintain eye contact with V) [note: do not include “realize”]
Chase V (chase V to foreground, chase V to background, chase V to foreground)
Pin V against wall (push V’s front against wall, trap V with arms, shove V’s back against wall, grab arms)
Speak to V (talk to V including threats and offensive language, yell at V)
Threaten V with knife (take out knife, hold knife near V’s face/neck, touch knife to V’s face/neck, put knife in pocket)
Look at V’s body (looks down V’s body, looks up V’s body)
Grope V (grope buttocks, breasts, and other body parts as she’s pinned against wall and on the ground)
Kiss V (kiss V’s neck while she is pinned against wall and on the ground)
Bring V to ground (grab V’s head, pull down V’s head, hold knife behind V’s head, straddle V, push V body to ground)
Lay on V (drop P’s torso onto V’s torso)
Cover V’s mouth (cover V’s mouth with hand, block V’s attempt to stop him)
Lift V’s dress (reach for V’s dress, grab dress, lift up dress to expose naked body, block V’s resistance)
Remove V’s top (reach for knot of V’s dress top, untie knot, pull down to)
Remove V’s underwear (reach for V’s underwear, grab underwear, stretch/pull down underwear, block V’s resistance)
Take out penis (subtle/off-screen: unbutton/unzip pants, grab penis, pull penis out of pants)
Penetrate [“rape” in correct context] V’s vagina/anus (subtle/off-screen: grab P’s penis, place near V’s orifice, thrust)
Lubricate P’s penis (lick P’s hand, subtle/off-screen: apply saliva to P’s penis)
Grab V’s hair (reach for V’s hair, grab hair, pull hair/head backward)
Get off V / Finish or disengage penetration (hands on ground, push up torso, subtle/off-screen: disengage penetration)
Sit down (use hands to walk off V’s body, sit on ground)

Monica Bellucci “Main Victim” Events (including fine-grained subcomponents)
MB1
MB2
MB3
MB4
MB5
MB6
MB7
MB8
MB9
MB10
MB11
MB12

Walk down hallway (walk down hallway, walk near/past/by P and C, stop when P attacks C)
Look at P and C (look at P assault C, gasp, maintain staring at P assault C) [note: do not include “realize”]
Run from P (run to foreground, run to background, run to background)
Scream (scream in Italian [assuming “help” does not count as an inference] while running from P and during assault)
Shove/push P (place hands on P’s chest, push P away)
React to knife (stare at knife, close eyes, become quiet, look up hallway, look down hallway)
Attempt to escape (slide down/up wall while at knifepoint, attempt to push and crawl away when brought down)
Cry (sob/tear/cry throughout assault)
Speak to P (talk in French [assuming “no” or “stop” does not count as an inference] during assault)
Attempt to block P from touching her body (push away P’s hands from buttocks and other body parts)
Attempt to block P from removing clothes (push away P’s hand from lifting dress, removing underwear, and untied top)
Attempt to peel away P’s hand from V’s mouth (grab P’s hand, dig fingernails into P’s hand)

Jara Millo “Escaped Victim” Events (including fine-grained subcomponents)
JM1
JM2
JM3
JM4
JM5

Enter hallway (walk into hallway, stop after about ten feet)
Speak to P (talk to P while walking into hallway, yell at P after being pinned against wall)
Scream (scream in Spanish [assuming “help” does not count as an inference] while being attacked by P)
Attempt to escape (grab P’s arms, restrain P’s arms from additional hits, crawl away)
Leave hallway (crawl toward exit, stand up, run out of hallway)

Unaccredited Actor “Bystander” Events (including fine-grained subcomponents)
UA1
UA2
UA3

Enter hallway (walk into hallway, stop after about ten feet)
Look at P and V (look at P assault V, maintain staring, does not intervene or get help) [note: do not include “realize”]
Leave hallway (turn around, walk out of hallway)

